CANDY S. GAW,                         )
                                                 )
    Appellee-Petitioner,                         )    
                                                 )
        vs.                                      )    No. 87A05-0403-CV-147
                                                 )
GREGG W. GAW,                                    )
                                                 )
    Appellee-Respondent.                         )
                                                 )
STERLING UNITED FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,            )
                                                 )
    Appellant-Third Party Defendant.             )

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Sterling’s petition for attorney’s fees.

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it joined Sterling to the dissolution proceeding. However, because the trial court dismissed Sterling from the proceeding, this issue is now moot. In addition, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Sterling’s petition for attorney’s fees. Therefore, we affirm.

Ind. Trial Rule 20(A)(2) (2004).

Importantly, Candy asserted no right to relief against Sterling. After the trial court joined Sterling to the proceeding, Candy filed no complaint against Sterling. Rather, she only made requests for various loan documents and payment records. See footnote Thus, Candy failed to establish even the first requisite for permissive joinder. See McCoy, 511 N.E.2d at 504. Therefore, Sterling could not properly be joined to the proceeding under Trial Rule 20.
As our supreme court has observed:

The [dissolution of marriage] act contemplates that the parties thereto are the parties to the marriage. The issues to be litigated are the grounds, child custody and support, the disposition of the property of the parties and, pending litigation, the matters necessary to an orderly determination of those issues. . . . Neither the rules of trial procedure nor the dissolution of marriage statutes are so broad as to require third parties to be dragged into marriage dissolution proceedings by their heels and there compelled to litigate issues that are but tangential to that cause of action.

State ex rel. Stanton v. Super. Ct. of Lake County, 265 Ind. 414, 416-17, 355 N.E.2d

406, 407-08 (1976).

Candy acknowledges that “it would not be common practice to join a financial institution in such an action,” but claims “[in] this case, there was no other alternative.” Br. of Appellee at 6. We strongly disagree. Candy also cites In re Marriage of Dall, 681 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), in support of her argument that “[t]here is no question that the proper application of monies paid on marital indebtedness make that issue relevant to the disposition of the marital assets and therefore to the dissolution proceedings.” Br. of Appellee at 11. However, the holding in Dall speaks only to the propriety of joining a nonparty to a divorce proceeding when a party claims that the marital estate includes an equitable interest in real property titled in that nonparty. See Dall, 681 N.E.2d at 723. The holding in Dall does not support the joinder of a third-party creditor like Sterling to a dissolution proceeding. Finally, we also note that the trial court granted Candy’s motion to join Sterling two days after it was filed, without a hearing, and likely before Sterling had even received its notice by mail. Under these facts and circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion when it joined Sterling as a party to the Gaws’ dissolution proceeding.

Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1 (1999).

A claim is “frivolous” if it is made primarily to harass or maliciously injure another; if counsel is unable to make a good faith and rational argument on the merits of the action; or if counsel is unable to support the action by a good faith and rational argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Commercial Coin Laundry Sys. v. Enneking, 766 N.E.2d 433, 441 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). A claim is “unreasonable” if, based upon the totality of the circumstances, including the law and facts known at the time, no reasonable attorney would consider the claim justified or worthy of litigation. Id. A claim is “groundless” if no facts exist which support the claim relied upon and supported by the losing party. Id.
Sterling claims that Candy’s motion to join them was frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless. The trial court ultimately agreed that Sterling should be dismissed as a party. However, while ultimately unsuccessful, we cannot conclude that Candy’s argument to join Sterling was completely unsupportable. In addition, Sterling argues that Candy filed the motion to join in bad faith for the purpose of harassment. Bad faith “implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.” Kovenock v. Mallus, 660 N.E.2d 638, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied (internal citations omitted). Sterling points to no evidence indicating that Candy’s motion to join was motivated by any dishonest purpose. Candy and her attorney were clearly frustrated by Sterling’s heavy-handed attitude. Although Candy’s joinder of Sterling borders on being unreasonable and groundless, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Sterling attorney’s fees.