FOR PUBLICATION


ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT :    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:

STEVE CARTER    CAROL SPARKS DRAKE
Attorney General of Indiana    Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton
            Lebanon, Indiana
SIERRA L. CUTTS
Deputy Attorney General     S. GREGORY ZUBEK
Indianapolis, Indiana    Whitham, Hebenstreit & Zubek
            Indianapolis, Indiana

THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF           )

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT,                )
                                         )
Appellant-Respondent,                    )
                                         )
vs.                                      )    No. 06A01-0302-CV-49
                                         )
BOONE COUNTY RESOURCE RECOVERY           )
SYSTEMS, INC., ROBERT H. BANKERT,        )
GREG    BANKERT, CINDY RUSSELL, and      )
JOHN BANKERT, JR.,                       )
                                         )
Appellees-Petitioners.                   )

The Environmental Law Judge concludes as a matter of law, based on the foregoing Undisputed Facts and Discussion, that: (1) [the Bankerts] are responsible parties for NSLI, BFI and BCRRS as the term is defined in Ind. Code 13-11-1-191; . . . [and] (4) the Commissioner of IDEM properly denied BCRRS’[] permit application pursuant to Ind. Code § 13-19-[4-5] and 329 IAC 10-11-1(c)(3)[.]

BCRRS then sought judicial review of the OEA’s decision. The trial court reversed the OEA’s grant of summary judgment and held that BCRRS was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The trial court found in relevant part as follows:
The Court concludes OEA erred, as a matter of law, in interpreting Ind. Code § 13-19-4-3 to require BCRRS and its responsible parties to describe [the N-95 order, Johnson v. BFI, and the Trustee’s objection to BCRRS’ first application] in their respective disclosure statements, as this is contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of this statute.

The court also found that the OEA erred when it concluded that the trial court’s findings in Johnson v. BFI constituted evidence of a violation of environmental law. This appeal ensued.

Finally, the reviewing court should neither substitute its judgment on factual matters for that of the agency, nor reweigh the evidence. Rather, the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the administrative proceedings, and the agency’s action will not be disturbed so long as there is substantial evidence to support the determination.

(Citations omitted).
    IDEM is the state agency responsible for the regulation of and the issuance of permits for all landfills within the state. See Indiana Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Ind. 1994). Indiana Code Section 13-19-4 is known as the “Good Character” law and sets out the requirements for the issuance, renewal, transfer or major modification of solid or hazardous waste permits. Indiana Code Section 13-19-4-5(a) delineates the grounds upon which IDEM may base a denial of an application for the issuance of such permits. The Commissioner of IDEM may deny a permit if he finds that:
(1) the applicant or a responsible party has intentionally misrepresented or concealed any material fact in a statement required by section 2 or 3 of this chapter;[ See footnote ]

(2) a civil or administrative complaint described in section 3(a)(3) of this chapter has been filed against the applicant or a responsible party within five (5) years before the date of submission of the application;

(3) a criminal complaint described in section 3(a)(4) of this chapter has been filed against the applicant or a responsible party within five (5) years before the date of submission of the application;

(4) a judgment of criminal conviction described in section 3(a)(5) or 3(a)(6) of this chapter has been entered against the applicant or a responsible party within five (5) years before the date of submission of the application; or

(5) the applicant or a responsible party has knowingly and repeatedly violated any state or federal environmental protection laws.

(Emphasis added). Indiana Code Section 13-11-2-191 defines “responsible party” in relevant part as “an officer, a corporation director, or a senior management official of a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, or business association that is an applicant[.]” The Good Character law is silent regarding what, if any, level of personal involvement in conduct resulting in violations is required before IDEM may determine that a person has “knowingly and repeatedly” violated environmental protection laws.
IDEM is authorized to deny a permit based on a single ground enumerated above, even where IDEM has earlier concluded that a violation did not warrant suspending or revoking the applicant’s existing Indiana waste management permit. See Chemical Waste, 643 N.E.2d at 336. And our supreme court has noted that the commissioner has broad powers to grant or deny permits “even where it is unclear that there exist any rational means for reaching a decision.” Id.
    Here, the trial court concluded in relevant part that IDEM’s interpretation of Indiana Code Section 13-19-4-5(a)(5) was invalid. Indeed, because IDEM based its denial of BCRRS’ application for a permit on that particular statutory provision, whether summary judgment was properly granted in favor of IDEM depends on the interpretation of that statute. The material facts are essentially undisputed. This court set out the applicable standard of review in Shaffer v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1072, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), as follows:
Statutory interpretation is a question of law reserved for the court and is reviewed de novo. De novo review allows us to decide an issue without affording any deference to the trial court’s decision. When a statute has not previously been construed, . . . our interpretation is controlled by the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory construction. Our goal in statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature. When a statute is subject to different interpretations, the interpretation of the statute by the administrative agency charged with the duty of enforcing the statute is entitled to great weight, unless that interpretation is inconsistent with the statute itself. When a court is faced with two reasonable interpretations of a statute, one of which is supplied by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, the court should defer to the agency. When a court determines that an administrative agency’s interpretation is reasonable, it should “terminate[] its analysis” and not address the reasonableness of the other party’s interpretation. Terminating the analysis recognizes “the general policies of acknowledging the expertise of agencies empowered to interpret and enforce statutes and increasing public reliance on agency interpretations.”

(Emphasis added, citations omitted).
    The question is whether someone who previously has served as an officer, director, or employee of one or more corporations with histories of violating environmental protection laws can be designated a “responsible party” who has knowingly and repeatedly violated environmental protection laws under Indiana Code Section 13-19-4-5(a)(5). This is an issue of first impression for our courts.
In its denial of BCRRS’ permit application, IDEM stated in relevant part as follows:
As part of the permit application, the applicant and each person who is a responsible party with respect to the applicant must submit to the Department such information as required by IC 13-19-4-2. [BCRRS], as applicant, and [the Bankerts] as responsible parties, each submitted disclosure statements to the agency.

Based on the IDEM’s review of the disclosure statements, and an independent investigation to verify the information set forth in the disclosure statements as provided under IC 13-19-4-4, the IDEM hereby concludes and finds that the applicant or responsible parties have knowingly and repeatedly violated state or federal environmental protection laws, as referenced in IC 13-19-4-5(a)(5). The specific violations that form the basis of this finding are found in the administrative proceeding captioned Indiana Department of Environmental Management v. Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc., Cause No. N-95, the matter of Keith Johnson, et. al. v. Bankert Farms, Inc., et. al., (Boone County Superior Court, Cause No. 06D01-9205-CP-145), and the federal court case United States of America v. Aluminum Company of America, et. al., No. IP91-591-C-M/S,[ See footnote ] all of which cases are hereby incorporated by reference.
Thus, IDEM interpreted Indiana Code Section 13-19-4-5(a)(5) to mean that when a corporation violates environmental laws, its officers and directors may, under certain circumstances, be deemed responsible for those violations in the context of the Good Character law. The OEA adopted that interpretation in its findings and conclusions. But the trial court rejected IDEM’s interpretation of the statute and concluded that the Bankerts could not be deemed responsible for NSLI’s environmental law violations. See footnote
    In the context of judicial review of administrative action, our supreme court has resolved the issue of which of two conflicting statutory interpretations should be followed. As the court held in Indiana Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co., Inc. v. State ex rel. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Com’n, 695 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ind. 1998), once an administrative agency’s interpretation of a regulatory statute is deemed reasonable, the reviewing court shall terminate its analysis and not address the reasonableness of a conflicting interpretation. Here, we think that IDEM’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable. As such, the trial court erred when it found otherwise and adopted BCRRS’ conflicting interpretation.
The evidence is undisputed that John, Jr. and Cindy were officers or directors of NSLI when the EMB issued a Notice of Violation in 1983, and Cindy was still a director of NSLI when the Board issued the N-95 order in 1987. John, Jr. and Greg operated heavy equipment for NSLI, and Greg was a shareholder and also served as site foreman and operations manager over a fifteen-year period ending in the early 1990s. In addition, Greg was largely responsible for winding up NSLI’s affairs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In their disclosure statements submitted in 2000, each of the Bankerts stated they had “over twenty (20) years[’] experience in the management of solid waste.” Thus, their “experience in the management of solid waste” includes the years they spent as officers, directors, or employees of NSLI. In addition, the N-95 order states that “[t]hroughout the permitted lifetime of the [NSLI] landfill, either [John, Sr.] or [John, Jr.] ha[d] assumed full responsibility for the quality of landfill operation in a personal capacity or as an officer of [NSLI].”
John, Jr. and Cindy claim that they “merely followed instructions from their father[,]” who was the “decision maker” for NSLI. But BCRRS and the Bankerts do not cite to any authority, nor are we aware of any, to support their assertion that only “decision makers” can be found to have violated environmental protection laws under the Good Character law. Instead, this evidence bears on the issue of mitigating factors. See discussion below; see also, Chemical Waste, 643 N.E.2d at 340 (noting “[d]isassociation from an individual guilty of an environmental violation is only relevant as one of nine possible mitigating factors[.]”).
Further, as we have already noted, Indiana Code Section 13-11-2-191 defines “responsible party” for the purposes of Indiana Code Section 13-19-4 to mean an officer or director of a corporation. A corporation acts through its officers and agents. Utica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Precedent Cos., LLC, 782 N.E.2d 470, 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). It is reasonable to conclude, as the OEA does, that a corporation’s violation of environmental law can be attributed to its responsible parties in the context of Indiana Code Section 13-19-4-5(a)(5). See footnote Indeed, given public policy considerations, chronic environmental law violators should be prevented from evading regulation merely by acting through different corporate entities. See, e.g., Chemical Waste, 643 N.E.2d at 340 (observing, in discussion of constitutional right to free association, “[c]ertainly, it is important whether a waste disposal company has owners or operators that have previously committed environmental crimes or delicts.”).
Finally, the statutory scheme provides applicants and responsible parties with an opportunity to present evidence to IDEM that they were not involved with the decision-making that led to a corporation’s violations of environmental laws. See Ind. Code § 13-19-4-6 (providing commissioner shall consider mitigating factors, including the nature and details of the acts attributed to the applicant or responsible party, and the “degree of culpability” of the applicant or responsible party). Here, IDEM expressly noted that it considered the statutory mitigating factors in denying the permit. See footnote In light of the evidence and the statutory scheme, IDEM’s interpretation of Indiana Code Section 13-19-4-5(a)(5) is reasonable.
In sum, IDEM did not abuse its broad discretion when it found that the Bankerts had knowingly and repeatedly committed environmental violations based on the evidence of violations committed by NSLI, BFI, and BCRRS. And the OEA did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of IDEM.See footnote We hold that the trial court erred when it reversed the OEA’s grant of summary judgment.
Reversed.
BAKER, J., and MAY, J., concur.