FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
WILLIAM W. GOODEN STEVE CARTER
Mt. Vernon, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ANDREW A. KOBE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ANDREW J. SCOTT, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 65A01-0307-CR-240
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE POSEY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable S. Brent Almon, Judge
Cause No. 65D01-0210-FB-510
February 27, 2004
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
KIRSCH, Judge
Andrew J. Scott appeals his conviction for dealing in a schedule II controlled
substance
See footnote
as a Class B felony and possession of chemical reagents or precursors
with intent to manufacture
See footnote
as a Class D felony. Scott raises three
issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Scotts motion to suppress
and allowing the admission of evidence found during the execution of a search
warrant on Scotts property.
II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Scotts conviction for possession of
chemical precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
III. Whether Scotts conviction for possession of chemical precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine
is a lesser included offense of his conviction for dealing in methamphetamine by
manufacturing.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 2, 2002, Officers Mark Saltzman and John Montgomery obtained a search
warrant for Scotts residence located at 8622 Welborn Road, Evansville, Posey County, Indiana.
The search warrant permitted the search and seizure of ether, anhydrous ammonia,
sulfuric acid, salt, lithium, starting fluid cans, and remnants of a burn pile
and any other items commonly associated with a clandestine manufacturing of methamphetamine, which
would include the chemical products, any glassware, or other instrumentalities used to store
or process methamphetamine.
Based on the evidence discovered during the search, the State charged Scott with
Count I, dealing in a schedule II controlled substance; Count II, possession of
chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture; and Count III, illegal possession
of anhydrous ammonia or ammonia solution
See footnote
as a Class D felony. After
a bench trial, Scott was found guilty of Counts I and II and
not guilty of Count III. Scott now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Motion to Suppress
Scott claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to suppress and allowing the admission of evidence found during the execution of
the search warrant for his property. Specifically, Scott asserts that the search
warrant was invalid because it was based upon observations made by the officers
during an earlier, warrantless entry onto his property.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress in a manner similar
to other sufficiency matters. Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207, 1209 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002). In reviewing a motion to suppress, we do not
reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial
courts ruling. Marlowe v. State, 786 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003). However, unlike the typical sufficiency of the evidence case where only
the evidence favorable to the judgment is considered, we must also consider the
uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Id. We will affirm the
judgment of the trial court if it is sustainable on any legal grounds
apparent in the record. Alford v. State, 699 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind.
1998).
The first police entry on Scotts property occurred when Officer Montgomery and Officer
Saltzman received a dispatch concerning a strong chemical odor emanating from a residence
on Welborn Road. Officer Montgomery determined that the odor was coming from
Scotts residence at 8622 Welborn Road. When Officer Montgomery arrived at Scotts
property, he observed three individuals standing by a fire, which was later found
to be a burn pile. Scott approached Officer Montgomerys patrol car and
asked why he was there. Officer Montgomery stated that there had been
a report of a strong acid smell coming from Scotts property. Scott
immediately complained that he was tired of being reported to the police for
chemical smells on his property. At this point, Scott told Officer Montgomery
to leave unless he had a search warrant. Officer Montgomery left Scotts
property but he noted empty cans in the fire and the strong smell
of acid in the air while he was there.
Shortly after Officer Montgomery left the property, Indiana State Trooper Werkmeister notified Officers
Montgomery and Saltzman that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Scott.
Approximately twenty minutes after Officer Montgomerys first entry on Scotts property, Officers Montgomery
and Saltzman and Trooper Werkmeister returned to the property to arrest Scott.
When they arrived, Scott was in front of his residence. Trooper Werkmeister
and Officer Montgomery secured Scott while Officer Saltzman walked around the property.
He walked from his vehicle around the east, torn out end of the
mobile home; behind and between the mobile home; around the west end of
the mobile home; and between the mobile home and the residence to the
point where Officer Montgomery, Trooper Werkmeister, and Scott were located. Officer Saltzman
was checking to see if the other two individuals that Officer Montgomery had
previously seen by the fire were still there. Officer Saltzman did not
see any other individuals as he walked around Scotts property. However, he
saw a fire burning that contained three empty aerosol cans, which had puncture
marks on the bottom. On two of the three cans, Officer Saltzman
was able to read starting fluid. See Defendants Exhibit 2.
Officer Saltzman also noticed an odor of battery acid in the air.
Officer Saltzman did not have a search warrant when he walked around the
property.
Subsequently, Officers Montgomery and Saltzman testified as to their observations at a hearing
for the issuance of a search warrant for Scotts property. The trial
court determined that probable cause existed and issued a search warrant. Following
the search and discovery of various materials associated with the manufacturing of methamphetamine,
Scott was charged with dealing in methamphetamine and possession of chemical precursors with
intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
Here, Scott argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress
because the search warrant was based on a prior warrantless search of his
property. See Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1030 (Ind. 1994) (holding
that evidence obtained during an illegal search may not be used to support
a subsequent search warrant). The State maintains that the trial court properly
denied Scotts motion to suppress and correctly admitted the evidence found during the
execution of the search warrant because Officer Saltzmans warrantless search of the property
was a protective sweep performed while Officer Montgomery and Trooper Werkmeister executed an
outstanding arrest warrant on Scott.
The U.S. Constitution and the Indiana Constitution provide different tests for determining whether
there has been a violation of the right to be free of unreasonable
search and seizure in such circumstances. Federal Fourth Amendment law protects citizens,
. . . from warrantless searches of places or items in which
the individual has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy which society recognizes as
reasonable. Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 143 (Ind. 1999). Exceptions
to the Fourth Amendments search warrant requirement before lawful entry include risk of
bodily harm or death, aiding a person in need of assistance, protecting private
property, or actual or imminent destruction or removal of evidence before a search
warrant may be obtained. Harless v. State, 577 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991).
Analysis under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution requires examination of
the specific facts of each case and whether police conduct is reasonable in
light of the totality of the circumstances. See Trowbridge, 717 N.E.2d at
144.
As discussed above, Officer Montgomery initially entered Scotts property after he received a
complaint concerning a strong chemical odor emanating from the property. Scott asked
Officer Montgomery to leave his property if he did not have a warrant.
Officer Montgomery complied but noted that two other individuals were standing with
Scott around a fire, the smell of battery acid was prominent, and cans
were in the burn pile. Approximately twenty minutes later, Officers Montgomery and
Saltzman and Trooper Werkmeister returned to Scotts property to execute an outstanding arrest
warrant on Scott. Therefore, at the point that Scott was arrested outside
of the residence, the officers suspected that Scott was manufacturing methamphetamine, which they
knew to be a process that could be quickly dismantled, and which they
knew to be highly volatile because of the explosive nature of the chemicals
used in the manufacturing process. Additionally and importantly, the officers had reasonable
suspicion to believe that the other two individuals that Officer Montgomery had seen
by the burn pile were still on the property and were capable of
inflicting bodily harm. The combined knowledge of the facts that the manufacture
of methamphetamine can be dangerous and that there were possibly other individuals on
the property that were capable of causing bodily harm would cause any reasonable
police officer to see the immediate need to identify any remaining persons on
the property, and insure they did not pose a risk of harm.
Here, Officer Saltzman conducted a protective sweep of Scotts property pursuant to an
arrest warrant. Officer Saltzman was looking for the two individuals who were
standing next to the burn pile with Scott when Officer Montgomery initially entered
the property. These individuals could have posed a threat to the officers
who were on the property to arrest Scott. Officer Saltzmans actions were
a reasonable attempt to secure the premises from a possible explosion as well
as to protect the officers on the premises from bodily harm. The
State argues, and we agree, that Officer Saltzman legitimately conducted a protective sweep.
A protective sweep is a legitimate justification for the entry into and
search of property under the exceptions to the federal warrant requirement. See
VanWinkle v. State, 764 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Harless,
577 N.E.2d at 248.
Additionally, under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, Officer Saltzmans sweep
was reasonable because he only walked through the area where Officer Montgomery had
observed Scott and two other individuals standing by a fire. This was
a logical route to determine if these individuals, who could have inflicted harm
upon the officers, were still behind the mobile home. Officer Saltzmans intrusion
was minimal, and the potential for harm existed. The sweep did not
exceed the scope necessary to determine if the other two individuals were still
present, and it did not last longer than necessary to complete the arrest
and depart the premises. Therefore, Officer Saltzmans sweep was reasonable and did
not violate Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Accordingly, we
conclude that Officer Saltzmans entry onto and search of the property in order
to protect the officers present was justified under both the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
See footnote
Moreover, we note that a search warrant may only be issued upon a
showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
See IC 35-33-5-1.
Scott does not argue that the officers lacked probable cause to obtain
the search warrant. Rather, he argues that Officer Saltzmans initial sweep of
the property was illegal and all evidence obtained thereby must be suppressed.
Because we conclude that Officer Saltzmans initial search was a justified and reasonable
protective sweep during the execution of an arrest warrant for Scott, we conclude
that the subsequent search warrant issued later that same day was properly granted,
and the evidence obtained thereby should not be suppressed. Accordingly, the trial
court properly denied Scotts motion to suppress. See Marlowe, 786 N.E.2d at
753.
II . Sufficiency of the Evidence
Next, Scott contends that the evidence presented by the State is insufficient to
sustain his conviction for possession of chemical precursors with the intent to manufacture
methamphetamine.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor
judge witness credibility. Oeth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002), trans. denied (2003); Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Instead, we examine only the evidence favorable
to the judgment, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Oeth, 775 N.E.2d at 700; Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 730. We will
affirm the conviction if evidence of probative value exists from which a fact-finder
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bailey, 764 N.E.2d
at 730.
In order to obtain a conviction for possession of chemical precursors with the
intent to manufacture methamphetamine, the State was required to present evidence that Scott
possessed the chemicals required to manufacture methamphetamine such as, chemical reagents or precursors
like pseudoephedrine, lithium metal, and sulfuric acid. See IC 35-48-4-14.5(a)(2)(8)(11). Scott
contends that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to sustain his
conviction because the State presented no direct evidence presented to prove that he
possessed sulfuric acid, pseudoephedrine, and lithium. Conversely, the State maintains, and we
agree, that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain Scotts conviction.
Here, the State presented evidence that Scott possessed Liquid Fire, which contained sulfuric
acid; medicine like Sudafed, which contained pseudoephedrine; and a lithium battery, which contained
lithium. Scott argues that the only evidence that the commercial products contained
sulfuric acid, pseudoephedrine, and lithium were the labels on the packaging. He
further maintains that the labels are inadmissible hearsay by arguing, the evidence for
the labels is not sufficiently reliable to prove an element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellants Brief at 16. However, Scott failed
to object to the admission of this evidence on hearsay grounds. For
purposes of sufficiency review, otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence may be considered for substantive
purposes and is sufficient to establish a material fact at issue when the
hearsay evidence is admitted without a timely objection at trial. Miles v.
State, 777 N.E.2d 767, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (failure to object at
trial waives any claim of error and allows otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence to
be considered for substantive purposes).
Because the State presented evidence that Scott possessed sulfuric acid, pseudoephedrine, and lithium
through labels on commercial products, we find that evidence of probative value exists
from which a fact-finder could find Scott guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
possession of chemical precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. See Bailey, 764
N.E.2d at 730. Accordingly, the evidence presented by the State is sufficient
to sustain Scotts conviction for possession of precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
III. Included Offense
Lastly, Scott contends that his conviction for possession of chemical precursors with intent
to manufacture methamphetamine must be vacated because it is a lesser included offense
of dealing in methamphetamine by manufacturing, for which he was also convicted.
IC 35-38-1-6 provides that if a defendant is charged in separate counts
with an offense and an included offense, and is found guilty of both
counts, judgment and sentence may not be entered against the defendant for the
included offense. IC 35-41-1-16 states:
Included offense means an offense that:
(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than
all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;
(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense
otherwise included therein; or
(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public
interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.
A lesser included offense is necessarily included within the greater offense if it
is impossible to commit the greater offense without first having committed the lesser.
Iddings v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1006, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
A person who knowingly or intentionally manufactures a schedule II controlled substance, which
includes methamphetamine, commits dealing in a schedule II controlled substance, a Class B
felony. IC 35-48-4-2(a)(1)(A). A person who possesses anhydrous ammonia or
ammonia solution with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine commits a Class D felony.
IC 35-48-4-14.5(c). We accept that it is impossible to knowingly or
intentionally manufacture methamphetamine without first possessing the chemical precursors of methamphetamine with the
intent to make the drug. The sole practical difference between these two
offenses is that one may be guilty of possessing chemical precursors with intent
to manufacture without actually beginning the manufacturing process, whereas the manufacturing process must,
at the very least, have been started by a defendant in order to
be found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine.
IC 35-38-1-6 does not preclude conviction and sentence for both offenses. Bush
v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Ingram v.
State, 718 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. 1999)). If the evidence indicates that
one crime is independent of another crime, it is not an included offense.
See Ingram, 718 N.E.2d at 381 (declining to hold defendants criminal confinement
conviction was lesser included offense of criminal deviate conduct and sexual battery where
force or threat of force went beyond that necessary to effectuate those offenses).
IC 35-38-1-6 only precludes convictions on multiple counts where those counts
had identical elements of proof. See Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686,
698 (Ind. 1997) (vacating attempted carjacking conviction as lesser included offense of attempted
robbery but emphasizing that it was necessary to do so only because both
offenses involved the attempted taking of the same motor vehicle). Thus, whether
an offense is included in another within the meaning of IC 35-38-1-6 requires
careful examination of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. See
Iddings, 772 N.E.2d at 1017.
In Iddings, officers first engaged in a controlled buy to purchase methamphetamine from
the defendant and then discovered several precursors within his garage while executing a
search warrant. Id. The jury convicted the defendant of both dealing
in methamphetamine by manufacturing and possessing precursors for methamphetamine. Id. The
defendant argued that his conviction for possession of precursors for methamphetamine constituted a
lesser included offense of his dealing conviction. Id. This court held
two independent offenses had occurred because the officers recovered completed methamphetamine from the
defendants residence in addition to the precursors to make more methamphetamine.
In Bush, officers executed a search warrant for evidence of marijuana and found
several precursors to manufacturing methamphetamine. Bush, 772 N.E.2d at 1021. The
officers found only precursors for methamphetamine, but not actual methamphetamine. Id.
The defendant was charged and convicted with both possession of precursors for methamphetamine
and dealing in methamphetamine by manufacturing. Id. On appeal, this court
sua sponte held that the defendants conviction for possession of precursors for methamphetamine
was a lesser included offense to his dealing in methamphetamine by manufacturing conviction
because officers did not find any completed methamphetamine in his residence. Id.
at 1024. Specifically, we reasoned that because no evidence of possession separate
from the manufacturing process had been recovered, it was impossible to fairly state
that the manufacturing and possession of precursors in this case were clearly independent
of each other. Id.
The clear distinction between Iddings and Bush lies in the evidence presented to
show whether two independent offenses occurred. In Iddings, there were two independent
offenses because the officers found completed methamphetamine during their search as well precursors
for methamphetamine. Iddings, 772 N.E.2d at 1011. Specifically, the evidence
in Iddings revealed that (1) the defendant had already completed the manufacturing of
some methamphetamine and (2) he possessed precursors with intent to make more of
the drug. Id. at 1017-18. In Bush, the same evidence
establishing that Bush was knowingly or intentionally manufacturing methamphetamine also established that he
possessed the precursors for methamphetamine. Bush, 772 N.E.2d at 1024. As
result, the possession of chemical precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine charge was
a lesser included offense of the manufacturing of methamphetamine charge.
Here, the evidence indicates that Scott had previously manufactured methamphetamine on his property.
Officer Cooper testified that punctured and burned starting fluid cans, empty mineral
spirits cans, stripped out lithium batteries, and two plastic containers that were being
used as HCL generators
See footnote were found on Scotts property. Further, the evidence
presented shows that Scott told Deputy Montgomery that he was tired of people
calling in to the police about the smell of ether emanating from his
property. Moreover, Jason Kinder, a jail officer at the Posey Court Jail,
testified that when he informed Scott of the charges against him, Scott stated:
I dont know how they can say I manufactured meth, I havent
manufactured any meth in two weeks.
Appellants Appendix at 129. Additionally,
the evidence reflects that materials to manufacture more methamphetamine were found on Scotts
property. Officer Cooper testified that he and the other officers found several
different pills containing pseudoephedrine or pseudoephedrine HCI, anhydrous ammonia, lithium batteries, Coleman Fuel,
salt, coffee filters, Liquid Fire, and plastic tubing in Scotts mobile home located
on his property. These items were not empty, but were full and
ready to be used to make additional methamphetamine.
In this case, the evidence presented reasonably leads to the conclusion that actual
methamphetamine had already been created on the property by Scott. Other
materials that were found in Scotts possession indicated that he intended to create
additional methamphetamine. Because the evidence supports the inference that two independent offenses
occurred, the possession of chemical precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine charge is
not a lesser included offense of the dealing in methamphetamine by manufacturing charge.
See Iddings, 772 N.E.2d at 1017. Thus, Scotts conviction for the
possession of chemical precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine need not be vacated.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
Footnote:
IC 35-48-4-2(a)(1).
Footnote: IC 35-48-4-14.2(c).
Footnote: IC 35-48-4-14.5(b).
Footnote: Because we find that Officer Saltzmans warrantless search was a valid
protective sweep, we do not need to address the States alternative argument that
the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress because the area viewed
by Officer Saltzman fell within the open field exception.
See Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1740, 80 L.
Ed.2d 214 (1984); Blalock v. State, 483 N.E.2d 439, 442 (Ind. 1985); Troyer
v. State, 605 N.E.2d 1183, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
Footnote:
An HCL generator is a device that is used in the
manufacturing of methamphetamine.