FOR PUBLICATION


ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

LESA LUX JOHNSON     STEVE CARTER
Indianapolis, Indiana     Attorney General of Indiana

MATTHEW D. FISHER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

JOSHUA KENDALL,         )

                             )
Appellant-Defendant,         )
                             )
vs.                          )    No. 49A02-0312-CR-1032
                             )
STATE OF INDIANA,            )
                             )
Appellee-Plaintiff.          )

III.    whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to suppress evidence;

IV.    whether the trial court erred when it made an alleged nunc pro tunc entry regarding its ruling on the motion to suppress; and

V.    whether his sentence is inappropriate. See footnote

The State’s sole cross-appeal issue is whether the trial court erred when it vacated Kendall’s possession of cocaine and a firearm conviction on double jeopardy grounds.

1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 2.3(f) (3d. ed. 1996) (footnotes omitted).
    This court also stated in Divello:
The circumstances determining which portions of property may reasonably be viewed as open to visitors are determined on a case-by-case basis and will necessarily include consideration of the features of the property itself, such as the existence of walkways and fences or other obstructions to access or viewing, the location of primary residential entryways, as well as the nature or purpose for the visitor’s call. Common experience teaches that under normal circumstances, uninvited visitors coming to a residence to speak with an owner or resident are expected to come to the residence’s most direct, obvious and prominent entryway, which in most cases is its front door.

    Under most circumstances, uninvited visitors are also expected to leave by the same route after knocking on the front door and receiving no response. Of course, the nature of the circumstances surrounding the visit can also affect the scope of the property open by implication. For example, persons previously invited to access a residence by alternate entryways, or those coming on truly pressing or emergency matters could reasonably be expected to seek out residents through areas other than the front door.

782 N.E.2d at 438. The Oregon Court of Appeals also made the following observation, after stating that police officers conducting an investigation generally have no more right to enter upon a citizen’s property than any other stranger:
Going to the front door and knocking [is] not a trespass. . . . Doing so is common in this society that, unless there are posted warnings, a fence, a moat filled with crocodiles, or other evidence of a desire to exclude casual visitors, the person living in the house has impliedly consented to the intrusion. Going to the back of the house is a different matter. Such an action is both less common and less acceptable in our society. . . . We do not place things of a private nature on our front porches that we may very well entrust to the seclusion of a backyard, patio or deck.

State v. Somfleth, 168 Or. App. 414, 422, 8 P.3d 221, 225 (2000) (quoting State v. Ohling, 70 Or. App. 249, 252-53, 688 P.2d 1384, 1386 (1984), rev. denied) (internal quotations omitted); cf. also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812 (1986) (stating “[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares”) (emphasis added). It is reasonable to conclude that persons living in a house with a publicly accessible front door and a back door not connected to the front of the house by any recognizable pathway would be highly surprised and quite possibly angered if a delivery person or solicitor approached their back door looking for them after they declined to answer the front door. Depending on the circumstances, a person might even reasonably feel alarmed or frightened if an uninvited stranger came knocking on their back door after the person refused to answer the front door.
    However, going to the back door of a house is not automatically improper. As this court held in Divello, “[w]hen there are open and obvious clues that a door other than the front door is to be used as a direct and primary entryway, then that door may also be approached by uninvited visitors.” 782 N.E.2d at 438. In that case, because a sidewalk led from the defendant’s driveway to a porch adjoining the back door, and the defendant also acknowledged that it was normal for visitors to come to either the front or back door, this court concluded that officers had properly approached the back door rather than the front door. Id.
Here, after Officers Tindall and Lawrence knocked on the front door of 407 North Hamilton and identified themselves as police officers, in response to an anonymous tip regarding drug manufacturing at the residence, they heard the occupants running inside the house. Thus, in this case the occupants of the house did more than merely refuse to answer the door. Their conduct in running to the back of the house, combined with the anonymous tip, did not mean that the officers’ “legitimate police business” was finished and that they had to leave the premises immediately after the occupants failed to answer the door. Instead, they were entitled to pursue their investigation using constitutional methods.
In so doing, Officer Tindall followed a sidewalk that led directly to the rear patio of the residence. There was no gate or obstruction blocking access to the backyard. Officer Tindall then stepped slightly off of the patio in order to look through the uncovered kitchen window. This de minimis straying “off the beaten path” does not render Officer Tindall’s conduct unconstitutional or unreasonable. Instead, he remained primarily on a recognizable means of access to the rear of the property that was reasonable under the circumstances. This case is unlike that part of Divello in which this court held it was improper for officers to cross through a private backyard and a privacy gate in order to access another property. 782 N.E.2d at 438-39. Additionally, Officer Tindall testified that there was no covering on the kitchen window that he looked through. Thus, his observation of Hardister disposing of what appeared to be cocaine down the kitchen sink was constitutional. See Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding police officer properly viewed drug paraphernalia through window with open curtain where “[t]here was no substantial or unreasonable departure from the access route to the front door nor was a particularly intrusive method of viewing used.”), trans. denied (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1027, 106 S. Ct. 1226 (1986).
Having responded to an anonymous tip of alleged drug manufacturing at the residence, having heard the occupants run through the house after seeing Officers Lawrence and Tindall, and then having permissibly observed Hardister dumping what appeared to be cocaine down a sink, police officers possessed probable cause that the residence did in fact contain contraband. Furthermore, exigent circumstances clearly existed with respect to the imminent destruction of evidence, thus justifying an immediate warrantless entry into the house to prevent that destruction without having to wait for a search warrant.
Kendall cites State v. Williams, 615 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), for the proposition that the police officers “created” the exigent circumstances here. We find Williams to be readily distinguishable. There, a police officer already had probable cause to believe there were drugs in a residence before he knocked on the door and it thus was clearly foreseeable that the occupant would attempt to destroy contraband when the officer knocked and identified himself. Id. at 488-89. We held the officer’s subsequent entry into the residence after observing the occupant run through the house was unconstitutional and noted that there was no explanation as to why a search warrant had not been obtained before approaching the residence. Id. Here, by contrast, the police officers did not have probable cause that 407 North Hamilton contained drugs, only an anonymous tip to that effect. They could not have obtained a search warrant before knocking on the door and the occupants’ response to the officers’ appearance was not clearly foreseeable, unlike in Williams, but only served to partially corroborate a tip regarding illegal activity at the residence. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence recovered during the search of 407 North Hamilton. See footnote

(3)     differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.

“If the evidence indicates that one crime is independent of another crime, it is not an included offense.” Iddings v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1006, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
It has been held repeatedly that possession of cocaine is a lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. See, e.g., Molino v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 1989); Davenport v. State, 734 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. Most recently, we held that it violated double jeopardy to convict a defendant of both possession of cocaine with intent to deliver as a class A felony and possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school as a class A felony, where possession of the same cocaine at the same time supported both charges. Jones v. State, 807 N.E.2d 58, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The State, in fact, conceded in that case that the dual convictions violated double jeopardy. See footnote
    In this case, the State specifically charged Kendall with dealing in cocaine by possessing the drug with intent to deliver it. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). The State also alleged that Kendall knowingly possessed cocaine and was also in possession of a firearm, namely, a handgun and a shotgun. See I.C. § 35-48-4-6(b)(1)(B). The amount of cocaine, plus the other evidence adduced, convincingly leads to the conclusion that there was dealing afoot here. However, the same possession of cocaine used to support the A felony dealing charge was also used to support the C felony possession of a cocaine and firearm charge. The State posits that there is no double jeopardy problem in this case because Kendall’s possession of a firearm was only necessary to support the C felony conviction, but was not needed to support the A felony conviction. Although that is technically accurate, we cannot agree that it is proper to allow the C felony conviction to stand.
    Pursuant to binding supreme court authority as announced in Molino, it is indisputable that Kendall could not have been convicted of the “base” offense of class D felony possession of cocaine in addition to a class A felony conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. It would be illogical to hold that such a conviction could not have stood, but the “enhanced” class C felony offense based on Kendall’s possession of a firearm is permissible. We also observe that in Jones, the fact that the defendant possessed cocaine within 1000 feet of a school was necessary to convict him of class A felony cocaine possession, but was not necessary to convict him of class A felony dealing in cocaine because more than three grams of the drug were involved. Compare I.C. § 35-48-4-1(b)(1) with I.C. § 35-48-4-6(b)(3). However, we still directed that the cocaine possession conviction be vacated.
    We conclude that the correct way to approach this case is that the enhancement of a cocaine possession charge because of simultaneous possession of a gun or proximity to a school or park is irrelevant to the lesser-included offense analysis – there is only one base offense of possession of cocaine with multiple possible penalty enhancements, not multiple possible offenses of possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, simultaneous possession of cocaine and a gun, and so forth. First, we observe that although a defendant must knowingly or intentionally possess cocaine in order to be convicted of possession of cocaine under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6(a), there is no mens rea assigned to enhancing factors under subsection (b) such as possession of a firearm, the quantity of the drug, or proximity to a school or park. See Walker v. State, 668 N.E.2d 243, 244-45 (Ind. 1996) (holding that dealing in cocaine statute requires no mens rea or scienter with respect to whether cocaine was possessed within 1000 feet of a school).
Second, in Thomas v. State, 684 N.E.2d 222, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), this court characterized carrying a handgun without a license, enhanced to a class C felony because the defendant had a prior felony conviction, as “a separate and distinct crime” from “unenhanced” A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. Our supreme court rejected this conclusion in Ross v. State, 729 N.E.2d 113, 117 n.17 (Ind. 2000). Also relevant is Belser v. State, 727 N.E.2d 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. There, we held that double jeopardy principles precluded the defendant’s convictions for two counts of arson based on the intentional setting of one fire, where one count alleged arson resulting in damage to a dwelling and the other count alleged arson under circumstances that endangered human life. Id. at 462. We noted “that the charges we examine today are merely enhanced charges of the base offense of arson” and that allowing multiple convictions based on different enhancing factors was a “hybrid” violation “of the double jeopardy violations Justice Sullivan discusses in his concurring opinion in Richardson.” Id. Belser and Ross and the language of the cocaine possession statute itself instruct us that, like the carrying a handgun without a license and arson statutes, we should regard possession of cocaine under Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6 (that is, possession without intent to deliver) as one crime under all circumstances that is not made a different, separate, or distinct crime by whatever enhancing circumstances might exist. As such, possession of cocaine under Section 35-48-4-6 is a lesser-included offense of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver under Section 35-48-4-1(a)(2).
We also note the holding in Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 319 (Ind. 2002). There, our supreme court held that where “a single act [i.e. one that results in serious bodily injury] forms the basis of both a class A felony burglary conviction and also the act element of an attempted murder conviction, the two cannot stand.” Id. at 324. This was so as a matter of statutory construction and common law, even though the convictions for both attempted murder and class A felony burglary did not violate the Richardson/Spivey “actual evidence” test because the burglary conviction required proof of elements not required for the attempted murder conviction. Id. As a remedy, our supreme court directed that the burglary conviction be reduced to a class B felony, because that level of burglary does not require proof of bodily injury.
In the case before us, a single act – possession of cocaine – forms the basis of both the class A felony dealing conviction and class C felony “simple” possession conviction. Here, unlike in Davis, we cannot remedy the problem of using this single act twice by reducing the seriousness of the class C felony possession conviction; if we disregard the single act of cocaine possession, there simply is no “lesser” crime of which Kendall could be convicted in addition to class A felony possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. In sum, we cannot say that Kendall’s possession of cocaine and a firearm is independent of his possession of the very same cocaine with intent to deliver and, therefore, it is a lesser included offense. We conclude the trial court properly vacated Kendall’s class C felony possession of cocaine conviction. See footnote

NAJAM, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

    I fully concur with the majority on Issues I, II, IV, and V, but respectfully dissent from the majority’s determinations on Issue III and the State’s cross-appeal. Consistent with the panel in Hardister v. State, 821 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), I would hold that the officers in this case violated the Fourth Amendment when, after the occupants exercised their right not to answer the front door, the officers ran to the back door of the residence in pursuit of those inside. Further, the trial court erred when it sua sponte vacated Kendall’s possession of cocaine and a firearm conviction because possession of cocaine and a firearm is not a lesser-included offense of possession with intent to deliver.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

“It is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’” State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). A principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter a residence for purposes of search or arrest. Id. Thus, searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Id. But there are a “‘few . . . and carefully delineated’” exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. (quoting United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 318).

(Footnote omitted).
    One exception to the warrant requirement is when there are exigent circumstances. See Smock v. State, 766 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Exigent circumstances which justify a warrantless search have been delineated as the “risk of bodily harm or death, aiding a person in need of assistance, protecting private property, or actual or imminent destruction or removal of evidence before a search warrant may be obtained.” Sloane v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1287, 1293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. Specifically, as our supreme court explained in Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ind. 1994):
Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search exist where the police have an objective and reasonable fear that the evidence is about to be destroyed; the arresting officers must have a reasonable belief that there are people within the premises who are destroying or are about to destroy the evidence. In such cases, the evidence’s nature must be evanescent and the officers must fear its imminent destruction. The fact that narcotics are involved does not, standing alone, amount to exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search or arrest.

(Citation omitted, emphasis added).
    The State asserts, and the majority agrees, that the officers’ entry into the home is justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. But while exigent circumstances justify dispensing with a search warrant, they do not eliminate the need for probable cause. Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. “In validating a warrantless search based on the existence of an emergency, as with any other situation falling within the exigent circumstances exception, the Government must demonstrate both exigency and probable cause.” Id. (citing United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161 (2003)). Here, just as in Cudworth, the State failed to demonstrate either exigent circumstances or probable cause required to support a lawful warrantless search. See id. at 141. The threshold and dispositive issue is whether Officers Tindall and Lawrence violated the Fourth Amendment when, after two occupants acknowledged the officers but refused to open the front door, the officers proceeded to run along the sidewalk toward the back of the house hoping that they would catch the occupants exiting the house through the back door.
    It is well established that “[i]t is not unreasonable for police officers, in the pursuit of criminal investigations, to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses at their homes[.]” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(b) at 476 (3d ed. 1996) (citing State v. Crider, 341 A.2d 1 (Me. 1975)). But it is also well established that persons have the right under the Fourth Amendment to refuse to consent to a warrantless entry of their home. See Camara v. Mun. Court of City & County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) (concluding appellant had constitutional right to insist that municipal inspectors obtain warrant before entering his home); see also Robinson v. State, 814 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (acknowledging right to reasonably resist unlawful entry of police officer into person’s home). Implicit in the right to refuse entry is the right to refuse to answer the door. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 696 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Ind. 1998) (“There is no question that police are required by the federal constitution to obtain a warrant to arrest a suspect who hunkers down inside his home and refuses to leave or answer the door.”). In addition, a person’s assertion of that right cannot be a crime. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 540 (concluding appellant could not be convicted for refusing to consent to warrantless inspection of home).
    Kendall characterizes the “initial police contact” in this case as a “knock and talk.” Brief of Appellant at 13. We explained knock and talk investigations in Hayes as follows:
A knock and talk investigation “involves officers knocking on the door of a house, identifying themselves as officers, asking to talk to the occupant about a criminal complaint, and eventually requesting permission to search the house.” “If successful, it allows police officers who lack probable cause to gain access to a house and conduct a search.” Both federal and state appellate courts which have considered the question, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, have concluded that the knock and talk procedure does not per se violate the Fourth Amendment.

“Though the ‘knock and talk’ procedure is not automatically violative of the Fourth Amendment, it can become so.” The constitutional analysis begins with the knock on the door. The prevailing rule is that, absent a clear expression by the owner to the contrary, police officers, in the course of their official business, are permitted to approach one’s dwelling and seek permission to question an occupant.

794 N.E.2d at 496 (citations omitted).
    Officers Tindall and Lawrence went to 407 North Hamilton to investigate an anonymous tip that someone was inside the house “cooking drugs.” Transcript at 272. Without attempting to corroborate that tip, however, the officers went directly to that address and knocked on the door. They did so without probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion. See Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d 184 (concluding anonymous tip insufficient to support issuance of warrant); see also Washington v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding anonymous tip insufficient to justify investigatory detention), trans. denied. See footnote The officers’ reason for going to the home and knocking on the door was legitimate, namely, to investigate an anonymous tip, but at the time they knocked on the door the officers had no constitutionally significant grounds for believing that anything illegal was going on inside the home.     
    After the officers knocked on the door, two occupants, at two different times, came to the front window next to the door and pulled back the curtain to see who was there. Officer Tindall testified that he shined his flashlight on his badge and said, “Police Department.” Transcript at 278. After making eye contact with the officers at the front door, the occupants refused to answer and, instead, headed toward the back of the house.
    To the extent that the majority questions whether the occupants’ actions constituted a refusal, the evidence clearly shows that the occupants communicated to the officers that they would not open the door. Again, a person is under no obligation to answer or open his door when police have no warrant or probable cause. Here, the occupants exercised their Fourth Amendment right not to answer or open the front door. Thus, the question is whether, given the occupants’ refusal, it was reasonable for the officers to run to the back of the home to see whether the occupants were leaving through the back door. It was not.
    As this court explained in Divello v. State, 782 N.E.2d 433, 437-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied:
When police enter onto private property in order to conduct an investigation or for another legitimate purpose and restrict their entry to places that other visitors would be expected to go, such as walkways, driveways, or porches, any observation made from these areas is permissible under the United States Constitution and the Fourth Amendment thereto. Accordingly, an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to things or activities within a residence that may be observed by persons using their natural senses from places impliedly open to a visitor’s entry. In general, this means that if police utilize normal means of access to and egress from the house for some legitimate purpose, such as to make inquiries of the occupant . . ., it is not a Fourth Amendment search for the police to see or hear or smell from that vantage point what is happening inside the dwelling. The implied invitation, however, extends only to those with legitimate business, and applies only to routes reasonable under the circumstances.

(Citations omitted, emphases added).
    The officers in Divello knocked on the door of two residences owned by the defendant to investigate an anonymous tip of drug activity. We determined in part that after the officers received no answer at the second residence, “they should have left, as the purpose for their visit to that property terminated due to the lack of any response from any occupant. Otherwise, the well-established right of citizens to refuse to answer their door would be illusory.” Id. at 439 (citation omitted).
    The facts in this case are even more compelling than those in Divello. The officers here walked along the sidewalk en route to the north and back sides of the house because they thought the occupants “were going to run out the back door.” Transcript at 28. But at that point, the occupants had already exercised their Fourth Amendment right not to answer the front door. Not only were the officers uninvited, but the occupants communicated to the officers that they were not welcome on the property. The State presented no evidence to show that uninvited visitors commonly used the back door to 407 North Hamilton to seek out residents. And while the officers had information that may have suggested illegal activity, that information did not rise to the level necessary to justify anything more than a visit along the most obvious and direct route to the residence. See Trimble v. State, 816 N.E.2d 83, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Simply put, once the police had encountered the occupants and were turned away, they should have left the premises by the same route upon which they had arrived.
    As this court warned in Hayes, 794 N.E.2d at 497, while a “knock and talk” procedure is not per se unlawful, it “‘pushes the envelope’ and can easily be misused.” We further stated in Hayes, “[k]nock and talk might more aptly be named “‘knock and enter,’” because it is usually the officer’s goal not to merely talk but to conduct a warrantless search of the premises.” Id. Again, while the “knock and talk” procedure is not necessarily unlawful, it is a dangerous short-cut around the bedrock requirement that police have probable cause to enter a home.
    The officers in this case, however, were able to complete only one half of the “knock and talk” procedure, namely, they knocked, but the occupants refused to talk. And the officers had not observed anything that corroborated the anonymous tip between the time they knocked on the door and when the occupants twice looked at them through the front window. Rather, the officers merely heard the two occupants, and saw their silhouettes, move toward the back of the house. And because this was an encounter between police and the occupants at a private home, the fact that the occupants were moving about inside the house did not justify the officers’ continued pursuit. Cf. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25 (holding officer had reasonable suspicion to perform investigatory stop of person in high crime area who ran away upon seeing law enforcement approach).
    Further, the officers’ concern that the occupants “were going to run out the back door” did not amount to probable cause or exigent circumstances that would justify pursuit of the occupants while still inside their home. Transcript at 28. Indeed, the State’s argument in this regard is understandably weak. The State’s entire argument regarding the reasonableness of the officers’ actions is as follows:
Officer Tindall ran to the rear of the house, hoping to intercept anybody fleeing out the back, which was a reasonable response under the circumstances. See [Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)] (noting that in so-called “open-view” cases where contraband is observed by an officer, in determining whether the officer has entered constitutionally protected space, “the question is not whether a trespass has occurred but whether the police officer’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances”).

Brief of Appellee at 11-12. But the occupants were free to leave their home by the back door. And even if they had exited, the officers could not have detained them because an anonymous tip is insufficient to justify an investigative detention. See Washington, 740 N.E.2d at 1246.
    Finally, this is not a case in which the officers knocked on the door, received no response, and then decided to try the back door hoping to make contact with someone inside the house. My research has revealed cases involving such factual scenarios. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296, 1300 (8th Cir. 1977) (concluding federal agents’ actions of walking to back yard were reasonable where their knock at front door went unanswered and agents saw a light on inside house and heard dog barking); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1100 (4th Cir. 1974) (concluding officer acted reasonably when he walked around to back door after receiving no response at front door when officer had reason to believe suspect was home), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); State v. Seagull, 632 P.2d 44, 48-49 (Wash. 1981) (concluding officer acted reasonably when he first knocked at one door, and then after remembering from previous visit that former occupants could not hear knock at that door, walked to another door). Here, after Officer Tindall knocked on the front door, two occupants came to the front window but did not open the door. As a result, the officers knew people were inside. Unlike in the cases cited above, there was no need for the officers in this case to go to the back door to ascertain whether someone was at home.
    In sum, I agree with the Hardister panel that after the occupants refused to answer the door, the officers were no longer on the property for legitimate business. See Hardister, 821 N.E.2d at 920; Divello, 782 N.E.2d at 439. Also at that point, any implied invitation the officers may have had to use the sidewalks or other common areas was extinguished. See Divello, 782 N.E.2d at 437. Therefore, after the occupants exercised their right to refuse to answer the door in response to Officer Tindall’s knocks, the officers had no further legitimate business on the premises and were required to leave by the same route by which they entered onto the property. See Hardister, 821 N.E.2d at 920; Divello, 782 N.E.2d at 438.
    As noted above, our supreme court has stated that “[t]he fact that narcotics are involved does not, standing alone, amount to exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search or arrest.” Esquerdo, 640 N.E.2d at 1027. The critical and controlling fact here is that the officers had no more than an uncorroborated anonymous tip that drug activity was occurring inside the home. And the fact that the officers heard and observed the occupants who had looked through the front window move toward the back of the house after they refused to open the door did not, in itself, justify the officers’ continued presence on the property. When the officers ran along the sidewalk to pursue the persons who had lawfully refused to answer the door, the officers entered constitutionally protected space without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and in so doing violated the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion is consistent with the most basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, namely, to secure the right of persons to be left alone in the privacy of their own homes. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting). See footnote
    Further, the Fourth Amendment violation in this case, and the admission of the evidence seized subsequent to that violation, is not harmless. Admissions of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis. Smock, 766 N.E.2d at 407. Harmless error occurs when the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt which satisfies the reviewing court that there is no likelihood that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction. Id. Violations of the Fourth Amendment must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We must find that there is no substantial likelihood the error contributed to the verdict, or, in other words, that the error was unimportant in relation to everything else before the jury on the issue in question. Id.
    Here, Kendall asserts that not only must the officers’ testimony regarding what they saw through the side and back windows of the home be suppressed, but all evidence later recovered from the home must also be suppressed, even though the police eventually obtained a search warrant. I agree. As this court explained in Sanchez v. State, 803 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied:
[E]vidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search or seizure has to be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. “When applied, the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine operates to bar not only evidence directly obtained, but also evidence derivatively gained as a result of information learned or leads obtained during the unlawful search or seizure.” Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has refused to adopt a “but for” rule, making inadmissible any and all evidence which comes to light through a chain of events beginning with an illegal stop or arrest. Rather, the Court stated, “the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Evidence may be purged of the primary taint if the causal connection between the illegal police conduct and the procurement of the evidence is “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the illegal action.”

(Citations omitted).
    In this case, the evidence recovered from the home pursuant to the search warrant has a causal relationship to the initial illegal police activity. Indeed, had the officers not run along the sidewalk in pursuit of the occupants who, according to Officer Tindall, may have planned to exit out the back door, Officer Tindall would not have seen Hardister pouring cocaine down the drain. It was that observation that, ultimately, provided both the exigent circumstances and probable cause to enter the home without a warrant. And the officers did not obtain a search warrant until after they had entered the home and secured the occupants.
    Still, the State maintains that because Kendall exited the house through the second-story window and threw what appeared to be two bags of cocaine, he abandoned that property. Kendall responds that the State’s abandonment argument must fail because the initial police action caused the abandonment. Again, I agree with Kendall. Abandoned property is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Swanson v. State, 730 N.E.2d 205, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). However, if the decision to discard property was caused by improper police conduct, the abandonment is not considered truly voluntary, and the evidence is not admissible. See id. The testimony during the hearing on Kendall’s motion to suppress shows that back-up officers observed Kendall and his two brothers exiting the second-story window after Officers Tindall and Lawrence ran to the side and back of the house. Officer Tindall explained that after he saw Hardister dumping what appeared to be cocaine down the sink, he ran back toward the front of the house and heard other officers yelling at persons on the roof. Based on that evidence, Kendall’s decision to exit out the second-story window and throw the bags of cocaine was caused by the initial, unlawful police action and, therefore, such evidence was inadmissible.
    In sum, all of the evidence the State presented to secure Kendall’s convictions, from Officer Tindall’s testimony regarding what he observed through the back window to the cocaine, guns, and money recovered from the home, should have been excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. Without that evidence, the State presented little if no evidence to support Kendall’s convictions, and, therefore, the error in the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Smock, 766 N.E.2d at 407. Accordingly, I would reverse and order the trial court to vacate Kendall’s convictions.