FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT :    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

DAVID W. STONE IV    E. THOMAS KEMP
Stone Law Office & Legal Research    Richmond, Indiana
Anderson, Indiana

DAVID A. FEDERICO
Hagerstown, Indiana

DANIEL F. MILLION,      )

                             )
Appellant-Petitioner,        )
                             )
vs.                          )    No. 89A01-0310-CV-377
                             )
JANET L. (MILLION            ) SWAGER,    )
                             )
Appellee-Respondent.         )

[2] The Court’s determination of [Father]’s obligation is based on 1/3 of those educational expenses not covered by grants and scholarships being paid by [C.C.M.], and the remaining 2/3 being paid by [Father] and [Mother] according to their incomes, 52% and 48% respectively. Therefore, 35% of those educational expenses not covered by scholarships and grants shall be borne by [Father] and 32% by [Mother], except that neither parties’ [sic] obligation shall exceed $4,000.00 per year.

[3] The parties’ obligation should be capped at $4,000.00 per year as that constitutes a reasonable limitation based on their incomes. The Court recognizes that this limitation will create a shortfall that [C.C.M.] will have to make up through loans or by one or both parties voluntarily contributing beyond the limit imposed by the Court. The Court notes that the cap imposed approximates one third the expenses that would be incurred at a state school. The Court is not persuaded that a financial benefit of [C.C.M.]’s record of academic excellence should inure to [Father] based on his reasoning that with such achievements [C.C.M.] could have obtained a “free ride” at Purdue. In choosing a school, [C.C.M.] is entitled to the benefit of his dedication to academic excellence and his parents should expect to make a reasonable contribution.

[4] [Father]’s duty of contribution for [C.C.M.]’s freshman year should be $3,172.00 (52% of $6,100.00 paid by [Mother]). [Father]’s duty of contribution for [C.C.M.]’s sophomore year should be limited by the cap imposed herein and he shall remunerate [Mother] in the amount of $4,000.00. Judgment should be entered for [Mother] and against [Father] in the amount of $7,172.00.

[5] [Father] shall be credited for such installments of $125.00 paid to [C.C.M.] attributable to college expenses upon proof of same and a judicial determination of such credit.

[6] [Father]’s duty of contribution for the academic years 2003-04 and 2004-05 should be 35% of those educational expenses not covered by scholarships or grants, to include tuition, room and meals, books, fees and travel expenses. [Father]’s contribution should not exceed $4,000.00 per academic year. [Father] should pay two installments of $2,000.00 to [C.C.M.] on or before August 15 and December 15 for each academic year. An accounting should be made at the conclusion of each academic year by [C.C.M.] and any surplus paid by [Father] should be remitted to him. . . .

(Appellant’s App. at 62-65.) Father appeals.

Commentary, Child Support Guideline 6 (1998).
    The trial court’s order indicates that it considered the factors required by the statute. The court considered C.C.M.’s academic successes in high school and at Cornell. (See Findings 5 & 7 and Conclusion 1.) The court took into account C.C.M.’s ability to contribute. (See Findings 8 & 9 and Conclusions 1 & 2.) The court also considered the ability of Mother and Father to meet the expenses. (See Findings 11-16 and Conclusion 3.)
    In addition, the court’s order indicates it considered the factors discussed in the commentary to the Child Support Guidelines. The court capped Father’s contribution at one-third the cost of a state supported university in Indiana. (See Conclusion 3.) The court considered C.C.M.’s ability to excel at Cornell University and his desire to attend a top-flight university. (See Conclusion 1.) By requiring C.C.M. to be responsible for 1/3 of the expenses remaining after grants and scholarships, the court made payment for C.C.M.’s education a “group effort” and “apportion[ed] the expenses between the parents and the child.” See footnote Commentary, Child Supp. G. 6. ( See Conclusion 2.)
    Nevertheless, Father claims the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous because C.C.M. could have received a “free ride” at a state university in Indiana and then Father would not have had to pay any college expenses. C.C.M. did not apply to any universities in Indiana, so the validity of Father’s expectation that C.C.M. could have received a full scholarship is uncertain. Father’s belief was based on conversations with unnamed individuals at the Indiana Academy, whom we have no reason to believe could have guaranteed a full scholarship to an Indiana university. Accordingly, the trial court’s refusal to relieve Father of all financial responsibility was not clearly erroneous.
Father also argues:
[M]other and [C.C.M.] unilaterally chose a private school even though there was joint custody which: ‘means that the persons awarded joint custody will share authority and responsibility for the major decisions concerning the child’s upbringing, including the child’s education, healthcare, and religious training.’ Ind. Code § 31-9-2-67.

(Br. of Appellant at 10.) We find Father’s argument somewhat misplaced. The record indicates C.C.M. tried, from December 2000 forward, to include Father in his decision-making process regarding college, but Father failed to respond to C.C.M.’s phone calls or requests for assistance. Rather, the first time C.C.M. and Father discussed the matter was when they encountered one another in a local store in May of 2001, after C.C.M. had already accepted an offer to attend Cornell University. Father also admitted he does not communicate with Mother regarding C.C.M.’s upbringing. Father had his attorney send a letter to Mother’s attorney in which he refused to provide financial information to universities outside Indiana, based in part upon the additional cost of such schools. However, that communication did not take place until February 15, 2001. If Father had engaged in the decision-making process with his son and explained the financial constraints to C.C.M. during the time C.C.M. was filling out applications for colleges, we might look more favorably on Father’s complaint that he was not included in the decision-making process.
    In addition, we note that Father testified at the hearing that he was willing to contribute three thousand dollars a year toward C.C.M.’s education at Cornell University. (See Tr. at 181-82) (“I am already paying fifteen hundred dollars a year here. I would be glad to contribute another fifteen hundred . . . .”). Accordingly, he may not challenge that portion of the trial court’s order. See Clark v. Madden, 725 N.E.2d 100, 105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding father could not challenge trial court order that he hire a nanny when father had offered to do so at the custody hearing). Given the trial court’s order requires him to pay, at most, one thousand dollars a year more than he expressly stated he was willing to pay, we decline to find the trial court’s apportioning of college expenses clearly erroneous.
    Father offered to pay three thousand dollars a year toward C.C.M.’s college education at Cornell University. The trial court ordered him to pay 35% of costs not covered by scholarships or grants, but it capped the amount he could be required to pay at $4,000.00 per year, which represents less than one-third of the agreed cost of an education at a state supported university in Indiana. As the cost of attending Cornell University is nearly $40,000.00 per year, the court’s order makes Father responsible for approximately 10% of the cost of C.C.M.’s college attendance. The trial court’s apportionment of college expenses is not clearly erroneous.
    Affirmed.
SULLIVAN, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.