FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DAVID A. BROOKS    STEPHEN R. CARTER
Valparaiso, Indiana     Attorney General of Indiana
            Indianapolis, Indiana

RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

WILLIAM R. DIXON,       )

                             )
Appellant-Defendant,         )
                             )
vs.                          )    No. 75A01-0407-CR-300
                             )
STATE OF INDIANA,            )
                             )
Appellee-Plaintiff.          )

Beatty v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 1991) (quoting Fointno v. State, 487 N.E.2d 140, 148 (Ind. 1986)). Dixon received the presumptive sentence for two of his four offenses. In addition, he received only slight enhancements for the remaining two offenses. Dixon’s sentence falls squarely within a rational sentencing scheme for these offenses. His sentence was appropriate given the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender.
    Dixon also asserts that the trial court improperly ordered his sentence to be served consecutive to his sentence in an adjacent county. In support of this assertion, Dixon cites Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35 (Ind. 2004), and Thompson v. State, 634 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). However, Dixon’s reliance on these two cases is misplaced. First, both cases deal with a previous version of Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2, the statute at the heart of the issue in the present case. In addition, Lee holds that an illegal sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement does not automatically render the entire agreement void, a holding that has no bearing on the issue in the case at bar.
When interpreting a statute, we look to the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory construction. Indiana State Teachers Ass'n. v. Board of School Com'rs of City of Indianapolis, 693 N.E.2d 972, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). However, we may not interpret a statute that is clear and unambiguous on its face. Schafer v. Sellersburg Town Council, 714 N.E.2d 212, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Rather, the words of the statute are to be given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning unless a contrary purpose is clearly shown by the statute itself. Id. Additionally, the language employed in a statute is deemed to have been used intentionally. Id.
    Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e) [sub-sections mandating consecutive terms of imprisonment], the court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively. The court may consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in IC 35-38-1-7.1(b) and IC 35-38-1-7.1(c) in making a determination under this subsection. The court may order terms of imprisonment to be served consecutively even if the sentences are not imposed at the same time. However, except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment, exclusive of terms of imprisonment under IC 35-50-2-8 [sentencing of habitual offenders] and IC 35-50-2-10 [sentencing of habitual substance offenders], to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the presumptive sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted.

(Emphasis added). As clearly stated by the italicized portion of subsection (c), the trial court has the discretion to order consecutive sentences even when the sentences are not contemporaneously imposed. See Jones v. State, 775 N.E.2d 322, 332 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting the trial court’s discretion under subsection (c)). In the present case, the trial court found it prudent, based upon the aggravating circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b) and the nature of the case, to order Dixon to serve his sentence consecutively to the sentence he received in the adjacent county from which he was fleeing after committing a robbery at the time he entered this county and committed the offenses here. Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the trial court neither violated its statutory authority nor abused its discretion by ordering Dixon to serve consecutive sentences.
    Dixon’s seventy-six and one-half year sentence is appropriate, and the trial court was properly within its discretion when it ordered Dixon to serve his sentence consecutive to a sentence he received in another county.
    Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.