FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

PATRICIA CARESS McMATH    STEVE CARTER
Indianapolis, Indiana    Attorney General of Indiana

             ANDREW A. KOBE
            Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

CHARLES R. STAMPER,     )

                             )
Appellant-Defendant,         )
                             )
vs.                          )    No. 37A04-0311-CR-574 
                             )
STATE OF INDIANA,            )
                             )
Appellee.                    )

The Court further observed that “[i]t would be illogical to bar all opportunity for reasserting one’s right to counsel once a defendant realizes his mistake in proceeding pro se.” Id.
In the case at bar, we first note that there is no indication in the record that the trial court considered the Koehler factors. This alone supports reversal. See Dowell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1063, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying defendant’s request to have standby counsel conduct his closing argument), trans. denied, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861 (1991). Moreover, applying the relevant factors to the facts before the trial court, we conclude that Stamper’s request should have been granted.
First, this appears to be the only time that Stamper had changed his mind regarding representation, whereas in Koehler, the defendant had already fired two attorneys. 499 N.E.2d at 199. It does not appear that Stamper every fully explained his reasons for wanting counsel, but in the note to the trial court requesting to withdraw his guilty plea and requesting counsel, Stamper wrote, “I didn’t realize what could happen to me at this time.” Appendix at 13. Although this may not be terribly compelling, there also appears to have been no ulterior motive for Stamper’s request. Also, Stamper’s request came at a natural break in the proceedings—after his plea, but before the sentencing hearing. See Koehler, 499 N.E.2d at 200.
We recognize that the Koehler Court limited its holding to situations where standby counsel was ready to take over representation under circumstances which do not disadvantage any of the other participants in the trial.See footnote However, we do not view the fact that Stamper did not have standby counsel to be fatal. Instead, we view it as a component of the fourth Koehler factor, i.e., disruption or delay in proceedings which might be expected to ensue were the request granted. Here, there is no allegation that appointing counsel would have excessively delayed the proceedings. Stamper’s request was made nine days before the scheduled sentencing hearing.
Lastly, the record does not indicate a high likelihood that Stamper would be effective if required to continue to act as his own attorney. Stamper did not dispute the charges against him, nor does there appear to have been any attempt on his part to negotiate with the State on a plea agreement. This was borne out by Stamper’s performance at the sentencing hearing, which was limited to a discussion with the trial court regarding his criminal record and time served and stating that he had read the presentence investigation report the “best [he] could,” and found no errors therein. Sentencing Transcript at 2. Stamper made no effort to argue for a lesser sentence.
Considering these factors, we conclude that Stamper’s request for appointed counsel should have been granted. See Koehler, 499 N.E.2d at 199-200. See also Goble, 766 N.E.2d at 7. (concluding that trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s request to have standby counsel conduct direct examination of the defendant where reasons for the request appeared legitimate, any delay in the proceedings would have been minimal, and the record contained no indication that the trial court had advised the defendant of the dangers of self-representation); Miller v. State, 789 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that trial court erred in denying defendant’s request to allow standby counsel to conduct voir dire where there was no indication that the trial court considered the Koehler factors or that granting the request would have disrupted or delayed the trial), aff’d upon reh’g, 795 N.E.2d 468; Dowell, 557 N.E.2d at 1067 (although reversing due to trial court’s summary denial of defendant’s request, in discussing factors which trial court should have considered, court noted that defendant’s request to have standby counsel conduct closing arguments was made prior to closing arguments, defendant had not previously made requests for substitution of counsel, defendant’s self-representation had been less than effective up to that point, and standby counsel was prepared to assume representation). Cf. Maisonet v. State, 579 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (stating in dicta that, even if defendant’s comments were taken as a request to abandon his self-representation, trial court did not err in denying such request; although the request occurred at a natural break in the proceedings, there was no standby counsel prepared to take over without interruption, the jury was seated, and request would have required lengthy continuance causing excessive delay).
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ROBB, J., and ROBERTSON, Sr.J., concur.