FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:

JOSEPH E. ALLMAN    JOEL K. STEIN
Macey Swanson and Allman    Tiede Metz & Downs, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana    Wabash, Indiana

JERRY LYNN “LENNY” NORDMAN,    )    

                                          )
Appellant-Defendant,                      )
                                          )
vs.                                       )    No. 85A05-0307-CV-367
                                          )
NORTH MANCHESTER FOUNDRY, INC.,           )
and EZRA GAHL, an Employee,               )
                                          )
Appellees-Plaintiffs.                     )

    Jerry Lynn Nordman appeals the trial court’s order granting his employer’s Petition for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction Prohibiting Violence or Threats of Violence. North Manchester Foundry (hereinafter “the Foundry”) claimed Nordman made a credible threat of violence against its employee Ezra Gahl. Nordman raises five issues, but we find the dispositive issue is whether his acts arose out of a labor dispute and thus the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Indiana’s Anti-Injunction Act.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Nordman argues the trial court erred in applying the Workplace Violence Restraining Order statute because his acts grew out of a labor dispute and therefore the Indiana Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”) controls whether an injunction may be ordered. The AIA sets forth certain labor-related acts a state court is without jurisdiction to enjoin, see Ind. Code § 22-6-1-4, but also specifies certain instances in which a state court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in a labor dispute. For example, Ind. Code § 22-6-1-6 states generally that no court of the state of Indiana shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except after findings of fact by the court, to the effect:
(1) that unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act excepting against the person or persons, association, or organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof[.]

(Emphasis supplied.)
As this case involves threatened workplace violence, both the Workplace Violence Restraining Order statute and the AIA could potentially apply. The Workplace Violence Restraining Order statute applies to any credible threat of violence in the workplace. The AIA applies specifically to threats of violence occurring during a labor dispute. When two conflicting statutory provisions appear controlling, the statute dealing with a subject in a specific manner controls over the statute dealing with the same subject in general terms. Turner v. Bd. of Aviation Comm’rs, 743 N.E.2d 1153, 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The AIA is the more specific statutory provision. Therefore, if it applies, the AIA is the controlling statute. Accordingly, we address whether the AIA applies.
When equitable relief is sought in the context of a controversy involving labor relations, the trial court must initially inquire as to whether the AIA has withdrawn the court’s jurisdiction to grant the desired remedy. Int’l. Ass’n. of M. & A.W. v. McGill Mfg. Co., 164 Ind. App. 321, 325, 328 N.E.2d 761, 764 (1975), reh’g denied. Therefore, we must determine whether the relief sought by the Foundry involved or grew out of a labor dispute within the meaning of the AIA.
    Ind. Code 22-6-1-12 provides:
When used in this act, and for the purpose of this act:
(a) A case shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; . . . or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a ‘labor dispute’ (as hereinafter defined) of ‘persons participating or interested’ therein (as hereinafter defined).

(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will follow;

(3) That as to each item of relief granted injury See footnote will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;

(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

(5) That the public officer charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property is unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. Such hearings shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been given, in such manner as the court shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the chief of those public officers of the county and city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property[.]

The statute requires the court to weigh evidence presented at a hearing and to make specific findings evidencing the court’s consideration of all the critical elements listed in the statute. Int’l Alliance Theatrical Stage Employees v. Sunshine Promotions, Inc., 555 N.E.2d 1309, 1312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
“[A] plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must affirmatively invoke the court’s jurisdiction by a verified complaint which alleges all of the factual assertions enumerated by the statute.” Pompey, 668 N.E.2d at 1248; Cf. Local Union No. 15 v. Indiana Glass Co., 771 N.E.2d 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (where the allegations of Indiana Glass’ complaint satisfied all five of the pleading requirements of section 6 of the AIA, the trial court’s entry of injunctive relief was valid).
The requirements set out in the AIA constitute an exception to the liberal notice pleading standard of Trial Rule 8(A). Pompey, 668 N.E.2d at 1248. When a plaintiff fails to comply with the procedural requirements of the AIA, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction from the outset to grant injunctive relief. When such occurs, the proper remedy is dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The Foundry’s petition for injunctive relief did not conform with the requirements of Section 6 because it failed to allege item (5) set out above. See footnote
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the court to dismiss the Foundry’s petition without prejudice. See Pompey, 668 N.E.2d at 1248 (“inasmuch as the dismissal is for failure to comply with procedural requirements and is not a determination on the merits, we further conclude that the dismissal should be without prejudice”).
Reversed and remanded with instructions. See footnote
BAKER, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.