FOR PUBLICATION


ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:            ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

BRYAN LEE CIYOU                 MICHAEL CHEERVA
Ciyou & Dixon, P.C.                    Phelps Fara Avery & Cheerva
Indianapolis, Indiana                    Indianapolis, Indiana
                            

IN RE:     THE MARRIAGE OF             )
DONNA J. MacLAFFERTY,                          )
                                               )
    Appellant-Respondent,                      )
                                               )
        vs.                                    )    No. 49A04-0309-CV-491
                                               )
WILLIAM P. MacLAFFERTY,                        )
                                               )
    Appellee-Petitioner.                       )

II.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the children’s summer day camp was no longer a child care expense; and,

III. Whether the trial court erred when it modified Father’s weeknight parenting time to allow Father to exercise that time on either Tuesday or Wednesday night with forty-eight hours advance notice to Mother.

We affirm.

Dunson v. Dunson, 769 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

Ind. Code § 31-16-8-1 (1998). The petitioner bears the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification. Weiss v. Frick, 693 N.E.2d 588, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded, “Mother’s change to full-time employment and the increase in her income attributable thereto constitutes a substantial and continuing change of circumstances sufficient to find that the previous Court Order regarding Support and Visitation is now unreasonable.” Appellant’s App. p. 19. Initially, we observe that when determining a parent’s child support obligation, the trial court should consider the financial resources of both parents and the standard of living the children would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved. Ind. Code § 31-16-6-1 (1998); Ind. Child Support Guideline 1 (2004).
The Indiana Child Support Guidelines provide that “[a] change in circumstances may include a change in the income of the parents, the application of a parenting plan, the failure to comply with a parenting plan or a change in the expense of child rearing specifically considered in the Guidelines.” Child Supp. G. 4, cmt. Father notes that our courts have held that “changes in the relative financial resources of both parents alone may be sufficient to modify a child support order.” Br. of Appellee at 7 (citing Harris, 800 N.E.2d at 938; Kirchoff v. Kirchoff, 619 N.E.2d 592, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), disapproved on other grounds by Merritt v. Merritt, 693 N.E.2d 1320, 1324 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied).
In Harris, modification of child support was warranted where the evidence established that Father’s employment was terminated, he obtained a new job in Colorado, and was required to invest $250,000 in the company. 800 N.E.2d at 938. Father’s new compensation package consisted of a base salary of $325,000, a car allowance of $750 per month, and a potential for bonus income of $162,500 annually. Id. The record also established that Mother had obtained regular employment earning $90,000 annually with a monthly car allowance of $500. Id. Our court held that the “change in employment and financial situation of both parties presents a substantial and continuous change to justify a modification in” Father’s child support obligation. Id. In Kirchoff, our court affirmed the trial court’s modification of child support where Father’s income had significantly declined and Mother’s income had significantly increased. 619 N.E.2d at 595-96.
    In this case, in less than one year, Mother’s weekly gross income increased from $324 per week to $709 per week because she obtained full-time employment. Appellant’s App. p. 25; Ex. Vol., Petitioner’s Ex. 2. Father’s weekly gross income also increased from $2287 per week to $2407 per week. Father offered an exhibit at the hearing showing a calculation of Mother’s total household income for the previous four years and her estimated 2003 income utilizing Father’s proposed reduction of his weekly child support obligation. The exhibit established that Mother’s household income in 2002 was $42,949 and her estimated 2003 income would be $55,676 if Father’s support were reduced to $313 per week. Ex. Vol., Petitioner’s Ex. 8. However, we also note that while Mother’s income increased substantially, her percentage share of the parties’ total weekly income only increased by eleven percent.
    Mother argues that the reduction in Father’s child support obligation will “cause the children’s lifestyle to erode in marked ways.” Br. of Appellant at 21. In support of that argument, Mother cites to her own testimony where she stated that if Father’s support obligation was reduced, she would likely have to eliminate certain items from her budget such as internet access or taking the children out to dinner. Id. (citing Tr. pp. 73-74). However, her testimony conflicts with Father’s exhibit, which she did not object to at the hearing, demonstrating that her yearly household income will increase by more than $12,000 even if Father’s child support obligation is reduced. Mother’s argument amounts to a request to our court to reweigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, which we will not do.
The Child Support Rules provide that “there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of the award which would result from the application of the Indiana Child Support Guidelines is the correct amount of child support to be awarded.” See Ind. Child Support Rule 2 (2004). Moreover, as we noted above, our courts have held that an increase in the parties’ income may constitute a changed circumstance so substantial and continuing as to make the terms of the existing support order unreasonable. Under these facts and circumstances, where Mother’s income more than doubled after she obtained full time employment, we conclude that the trial court’s order reducing Father’s child support obligation was not clearly erroneous. See footnote

Child Supp. G. 3(E), cmt.     
    The trial court made the following findings with regard to the children’s summer day camp:
16. Father’s wife Alicia, is a homemaker and can provide care for the parties’ children at no cost during the summer. The boys have a good relationship with their stepmother and enjoy being with their sisters[.] Spending time at Father’s home during the summer would eliminate the need for the boys to attend summer camp for the six (6) week period that they have attended in the past. While Father believes that some summer camp attendance is beneficial, it is his opinion that the number of weeks should be limited and that cost should be treated as an extra-curricular expense and, thereby, eliminated from the child support calculation as a daycare expense.

18. Father is willing to assist with the necessary travel, accommodations and arrangements to assist in new summer camp and summer visitation schedules.

Appellant’s App. p. 12. The trial court also issued the following conclusion of law:
5. The Court finds that the children’s summer day camp is no longer needed as a child care expense and beginning with the summer 2004, shall be treated as an extracurricular activity. The cost shall be divided equally by the parties beginning with the summer of 2004.

Appellant’s App. p. 19.
It is undisputed that Mother has obtained full-time employment, and therefore, during the summer when the children are not in school they require supervision. However, at the hearing, Father argued that child care is available in his home at no cost to be provided by his wife. We also note that during the summer of 2004, the children will be thirteen and eleven years old. At the hearing, Mother testified that their older son “wants to work” at the summer day camp during the summer of 2004. Father argues that if a child is old enough to work at the camp, then he is not in need of child care. See footnote See Br. of Appellee at 10. Finally, the trial court did not order Mother to pay the full cost of the camp, but ordered the parties to share the cost equally. Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the summer day camp was no longer a necessary child care expense.