FOR PUBLICATION


ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD and
CLERK OF THE MARION CIRCUIT COURT:     WILLIAM R. GROTH
GEOFFREY S. LOHMAN
WILLIAM BOCK, III    Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth & Towe
MARK J. COLUCCI    Indianapolis, Indiana
Kroger, Gardis & Regas, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD:

DANIEL LADENDORF
Ladendorf & Ladendorf
Indianapolis, Indiana

     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DORIS A. SADLER, in her official capacity as       )
Clerk of the Marion Superior and Circuit Courts and     )
as a member of the MARION COUNTY                        )
ELECTION BOARD; CANDACE MARENDT and                     )
STEVEN R. EICHHOLTZ; each in their official             )
capacities as members of the MARION COUNTY              )
ELECTION BOARD,                                         )
                                                        )
Appellants-Defendants,                                  )
                                                        )
vs.                                                     )    No. 49A02-0310-CV-864
                                                        )
STATE OF INDIANA ex rel.                                )
JOANNE M. SANDERS, ROZELLE BOYD,                        )
LONNELL (KING RO                                        ) CONLEY, RON GIBSON    )
and MARION COUNTY DEMOCRATIC                            )
CENTRAL COMMITTEE,                                      )
                                                        )
Appellees-Plaintiffs.                                   )

    APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable James E. Harris, Special Judge
    Cause No. 49D07-0309-PL-1709

    July 19, 2004

    OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

CRONE, Judge

Appellants’ App. at 6-17 (some alterations added).
    On October 9, 2003, Appellants filed a notice of appeal. The next day, this court granted Appellants’ motion for expedited appeal and ordered briefing completed by October 21, 2003. Oral argument was scheduled for October 24, 2003. On October 14, 2003, Appellants filed a motion to remand for further proceedings, which this court granted that same day. On October 15, 2003, after a hearing, the parties entered into an agreement modifying the trial court’s order that reads in relevant part as follows:
    1.    For purposes of the November 4, 2003 municipal election only, it is agreed that the Marion County Election Board shall utilize a ballot with the office block arrangement of candidates similar to the ballot being used for absentee voting under this Court’s October 8, 2003 Order ….
    2.    Nothing herein shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of any party’s legal positions with respect to any ballot arrangement or the use of “The A-Team” in the Republican Party’s device with regard to any future elections.
    3.    Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to constitute a waiver of any party’s legal positions with respect to the appeal of this Court’s October 8, 2003 Order currently pending before the Indiana Court of Appeals ….
    4.    Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to constitute a waiver of any legal rights of any party other than as expressly set forth in this Agreement.

Id. at 20. We now address the merits of Appellants’ appeal.

Romine, 782 N.E.2d at 379 (citation omitted). Indiana’s election laws contain no such exclusivity provisions. See footnote Given Appellees’ lack of an available administrative remedy, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider their request for a preliminary injunction.
    In reviewing the trial court’s grant of the preliminary injunction, we employ the following standard:
The grant or denial of a request for a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and our review is limited to whether there was a clear abuse of that discretion. When determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the trial court is required to make special findings of fact and state its conclusions thereon. When findings and conclusions thereon are made, we must determine if the trial court’s findings support the judgment. We will reverse the trial court’s judgment only when it is clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We consider the evidence only in the light most favorable to the judgment and construe findings together liberally in favor of the judgment. Moreover, the power to issue a preliminary injunction should be used sparingly, and such relief should not be granted except in rare instances in which the law and facts are clearly within the moving party’s favor.

Robert’s Hair Designers, Inc. v. Pearson, 780 N.E.2d 858, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).
    To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party typically must show by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) the movant’s remedies at law are inadequate, thus causing irreparable harm pending resolution of the substantive action; (2) the movant has at least a reasonable likelihood of success at trial by establishing a prima facie case; (3) threatened injury to the movant outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving party resulting from the granting of an injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved.

Apple Glen Crossing, LLC v. Trademark Retail, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ind. 2003).
    “However, when the acts sought to be enjoined are unlawful, the plaintiff need not make a showing of irreparable harm or a balance of the hardship in his favor.” L.E. Servs., Inc. v. State Lottery Comm’n of Ind., 646 N.E.2d 334, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.
The elimination of two prongs eases the burden on the party seeking the injunction. When the per se rule is invoked, the court has determined that the defendant’s actions have violated a statute and, thus, that the public interest is so great that the injunction should issue regardless of whether the plaintiff has actually incurred irreparable harm or whether the plaintiff will suffer greater injury than the defendant. Accordingly, invocation of the rule is only proper when it is clear that the statute has been violated.

Union Twp. Sch. Corp. v. State ex rel. Joyce, 706 N.E.2d 183, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted), trans. denied (1999). Appellants contend that the trial court erroneously invoked the per se rule in this case. We disagree.
    In reviewing the relevant statutes, we note that “[a] question of statutory interpretation is a matter of law to be determined by this court. We are not bound by a trial court’s legal interpretation of a statute and need not give it deference. We independently determine the statute’s meaning and apply it to the facts before us.” Perry-Worth Concerned Citizens v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Boone County, 723 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted), trans. denied. In construing statutes, our goal “is to seek out and give effect to the intent of our legislature. In attempting to determine legislative intent, we give considerable deference to an interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with administering the statute.” Area Interstate Trucking, Inc. v. Ind. State Dep’t of Revenue, 574 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted), trans. denied. Nevertheless, an agency’s interpretation of a statute “is not binding upon this Court when that interpretation is incorrect or if the legislative will is obvious.” Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Sutherland Lumber, 182 Ind. App. 133, 140, 394 N.E.2d 949, 954 (1979), trans. denied. See footnote
    “We ordinarily endeavor to give words appearing in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning, absent a clearly manifested legislative purpose to do otherwise. Additionally, statutory provisions covering the same general subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed together to produce a harmonious statutory scheme.” Salmon v. City of Bloomington, 761 N.E.2d 440, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted). We must determine and then apply the legislative intent underlying the statutes and construe them
in such a way as to prevent absurdity and hardship and to favor public convenience. In so doing, we consider the objects and purposes of the statute[s], as well as the effects and consequences of such an interpretation. We will not read into a statute that which is not the manifest intent of the legislature. Hence, it is as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say. The first and often the last step in interpreting a statute is to examine the language of the statute. We are guided by the principle that the best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the language found in the statute itself.

Robinson v. Gazvoda, 783 N.E.2d 1245, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.
    As previously mentioned, Indiana Code Section 3-11-2-5 provides, “The nominees of a political party or group of petitioners shall be listed on the ballots under the name and device of the party or petitioners as designated by them in their certificate or petition, or if none is designated, then under some suitable name or device.” (Emphasis added.) This statute unambiguously mandates that the party-column format be the “default setting” for ballots in Indiana. See Romine, 782 N.E.2d at 379 (“‘When the word ‘shall’ appears in a statute, it is construed as mandatory rather than directory unless it appears clear from the context or the purpose of the statute that the legislature intended a different meaning.’”) (citation omitted). This mandate is not absolute, however. Indiana Code Section 3-11-2-10 acknowledges that variations in ballot arrangement for ballot card voting systems are permitted under Indiana Code Section 3-11-13-11. See Ind. Code § 3-11-2-10(e) (“Except for variations in ballot arrangement permitted for … ballot card voting systems under IC 3-11-13-11, … the list of candidates of the political party shall be placed immediately under the instructions for voting a straight party ticket.”). Indiana Code Section 3-11-13-11 provides, “The ballot information, whether placed on the ballot card or on the marking device should, as far as practicable, be in the order of arrangement provided for ballots under IC 3-11-2.” (Emphasis added.) Under this statute, the legislature granted county election boards discretion to determine the practicability of placing ballot information in the order of arrangement specified in Indiana Code Chapter 3-11-2. See Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Indpls., C. & S. Traction Co., 169 Ind. 634, 637, 81 N.E. 487, 488 (1907) (determining that statutory phrase “if the court shall find it practicable” implies discretion).
    The problem in the instant case, however, is that the Board (through its vendor, ES&S) used an office block format as the “default setting” without first determining the practicability of using a party-column format as required by Indiana Code Sections 3-11-2-5 and 3-11-13-11. See footnote We disagree with the trial court’s order to the extent it suggests that the Board had no discretion to use an office block ballot format, but we agree with its determination that the Board violated state election law, specifically by failing to use a party-column ballot format without first determining its practicability. See Ind. Code §§ 3-11-2-5, 3-11-13-11. See footnote Consequently, Appellees were not required to “make a showing of irreparable harm or a balance of the hardship in [their] favor.” L.E. Servs., Inc., 646 N.E.2d at 349.
    With respect to the two remaining requirements for a preliminary injunction, Appellants do not specifically challenge the trial court’s conclusion that Appellees demonstrated at least a reasonable likelihood of success at trial, but instead dispute its conclusion that the public interest would not be disserved by the granting of an injunction. Appellants refer to testimony regarding the time it would have taken to reprogram the M-100 tabulators and to redesign, test, and print new ballots; See footnote the difficulty of training election volunteers; and the possibility of errors and a postponement of the election. The fact remains, however, that no one testified that revising the ballot format before the November 4 election date would be impossible or that other insurmountable problems were certain to arise. Appellants’ argument is a request to reweigh the evidence in their favor, which we may not do. We wholeheartedly agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the public interest is not disserved “by the issuance of an injunction that requires only that the [Appellants] comply with the clear dictates of law.” Appellants’ App. at 17.
    In sum, we affirm the trial court’s grant of the preliminary injunction with respect to the Board’s use of an office block ballot format. Given our determination that the Board failed to assess the practicability of using a party-column ballot format, rather than erred in making such an assessment, issues regarding the meaning of “practicable” and the standard by which a county election board should assess practicability are not squarely before us. It seems clear, however, that a board should develop a record of its deliberations regarding ballot format as a means of forestalling possible challenges and preparing for any challenges that do arise. The legislature’s stated preference for the party-column ballot format may be likened to a “rebuttable presumption” in its favor, and a county election board must overcome that presumption with sufficient proof of that format’s impracticability before it may use another ballot format with a given voting system in a given election.

Bd. of Comm’rs of Morgan County v. Wagoner, 699 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). In the instant case, we conclude that the issue of the legality of the “A Team” device is both moot and, even if of great public importance, unlikely to recur.
    Indiana Code Section 3-8-7-11 reads as follows:
    (a) Except as provided in subsection (f), if a political party has filed a statement with the election division (or any of its predecessors) that the device selected by the political party be used to designate the candidates of the political party on the ballot for all elections throughout the state, the device must be used until:
(1) the device is changed in accordance with party rules; and
(2) a statement concerning the use of the new device is filed with the election division.
    (b) Except as provided in subsection (c), the device may be any appropriate symbol.
    (c) A political party or an independent candidate may not use as a device:
(1) a symbol that has been previously been filed by a political party or candidate with the election division (or any of its predecessors);
(2) the coat of arms or seal of the state or of the United States;
(3) the national or state flag; or
(4) any other emblem common to the people.
    (d) Not later than noon, August 20, before each election:
(1) the state chairman of each political party whose candidates are to be certified under this section; or
(2) an individual filing a petition of nomination for candidates to be certified under this section;
shall file with the election division a camera-ready copy of the device under which the candidates of the political party or the petitioner are to be listed so that ballots may be prepared using the best possible reproduction of the device.
    (e) This subsection applies to a candidate or political party whose name or device is to be printed only on ballots prepared by a county election board. Not later than noon, August 20, the chairman of the political party or the petitioner of nomination shall file a camera-ready copy of the device under which the candidates of the political party or the petitioner are to be listed with the county election board of each county in which the name of the candidate or party will be placed on the ballot.
    (f) If a copy of the device is not filed in accordance with subsection (c) or (d), or unless a device is designated in accordance with section 26 or 27 of this chapter [regarding selection of devices for factions within a political party], the election division or county election board is not required to use any device to designate the list of candidates.

(Emphases added.)
    Bearing in mind the principles of statutory interpretation, we conclude that only a state political party chairman may file a copy of a device with a county election board. We first observe that subsection (d) of the statute specifically refers to state political party chairmen, whereas subsection (e) does not specifically refer to county political party chairmen. See J.A.W. v. Marion County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 687 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 n.21 (Ind. 1997) (applying rule of ejusdem generis, which provides that “‘where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned’”) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 517 (6th ed. 1990)). Our interpretation is further buttressed by subsection (e)’s requirement that a copy of a device be filed in each county in which the political party will be placed on the ballot; it would be absurd to suggest that a county political party chairman possesses this statewide authority.
    Accordingly, we conclude that Keeler had no authority to file a copy of the “A Team” device in the first place, and that the likelihood of the state Republican party chairman filing a copy of a similar device in the future is so remote as to be purely speculative. Because this issue is both moot and unlikely to recur, we decline to address it.
    Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.