FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

SAMUEL S. SHAPIRO    STEVE CARTER
Bloomington, Indiana    Attorney General of Indiana

GEORGE P. SHERMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

MORRIS L. PERCIFIELD,                    )
                                              )
Appellant-Defendant,                          )
                                              )
vs.                                           )    No. 53A04-0312-CR-643
                                              )
STATE OF INDIANA,                             )
                                              )
Appellee-Plaintiff.                           )

                                          

Crussen:    Who’s that?

Percifield:    He’s not in town.

Crussen:    Okay. At this point, because we’re going to do some other investigation, we’ve got a couple more of your cohorts involved, if you’re going to make a phone call to an attorney I have to bring a phone in here and have you dial the attorney’s number out of the phone book. I’m not letting you make any phone calls to anybody besides an attorney.

Percifield:    That’s fine.

Crussen:    Okay. So, if you want to call an attorney . . .

Percifield:    I’ve got the number up here. You can see the number here. It is an attorney.

Crussen:    Okay. Who is it?

Percifield:    It’s Deckard. It’ll come up Deckard.

Crussen:    Okay. Are they in the phone book or is this . . .

Percifield:    Yeah. Indianapolis phone book.

Crussen:    Okay. I’ll go get an Indianapolis phone book.

Percifield:    Yeah.

Crussen:    Because if you decide that you’d rather not do anything along those lines . . .

Percifield:    And call somebody else?

Crussen:    Exactly.

Percifield:    No, I’m not going to do that.

Crussen:    Because there’s somebody else that we know is involved that I don’t want you tipping off that . . .

Percifield:    I’m not going to do that.

Crussen:    . . . with a call. So, I don’t have any problem with you contacting an attorney, you know.

Percifield:    Maybe.

Crussen:    How much?

Percifield:    Yes, there is.

Crussen:    How much are we going to find? Cause the way it works is if you’re, if you’re straight up with me and say, “Oh, here’s what’s there and here’s where it’s at,” that saves us hours of having to search, so if we’re going to move from you to your connection, the quicker we do this, the less suspicious it looks for everybody involved.

Percifield:    Let me, get me an Indianapolis phone book and I’ll call my friend first.

Crussen:    Okay. Just sit right there. I’ll have to . . .

Percifield:    Oh, I’m not going anywhere. Obviously. Now, I’ll be easy to deal with.

Crussen:    I understand, and I don’t blame you for wanting to have some idea of what you should do. Just sit tight and I’ll be right back.

Appellant’s Appendix at 38-45. Later that same day, Detective Kevin Hill sought a warrant to search Percifield’s residence. The Monroe Circuit Court held a probable cause hearing at which Detective Hill testified that:
Detective Crussen and I have been conducting a cocaine dealing investigation with Morris Percifield and Robert Hardwick as the suspects. Morris Percifield resides at the 811 Winding Way address. On yesterday’s date, which would have been the 17th of January, we conducted a controlled buy on approximately a half an ounce of cocaine from this group. And how the deal went down was, the informant did a tape recorded phone call to Morris Percifield’s cell phone. He was out of state and he made arrangements to have his what we would call a “runner” drop the drugs off. We made arrangements for the “runner” [to] show up at the informants [sic] house. They didn’t meet one another. This person just showed up and put the drugs on the front porch in the barbeque grill. I was standing inside the house and looking out the window when the person arrived. He was identified in that investigation as Robert Hardwick. I have arrested him for dealing cocaine in 1993 and took a conviction on that case. We didn’t arrest him that day; we just let him leave. On today’s date the informant was to pay the money for that half ounce that she received yesterday to Morris Percifield. And then purchase another half ounce for a total of $1,250 dollars and we called Morris Percifield at his home phone number which is at the address on the search warrant and made arrangements to meet him at the Taco Bell on West Third Street to pay money for yesterday’s deal and for the purchase of another half ounce today. That phone call was tape recorded as well. Paul Buckman with D.E.A. was helping us in this investigation and he did surveillance on the house and was watching the house and saw Morris Percifield, or at least an individual matching his description get into the white van that was parked in front of the house and then leave and drive to Taco Bell and meet the informant while we were waiting for him to show up. The informant states that Percifield works for a book company and drives a white van. The white van that was parked in front of the house is registered to some sort of book company, a company vehicle. When he showed up, he did the deal with the informant. She paid him the money. He delivered another half ounce of the substance consistent with cocaine. She left and then turned the cocaine over to me. When he left the parking lot Detective Crussen and Captain Qualters stopped him in his vehicle and took him under arrest and search incident to his arrest and was in possession of our serial number recorded by money. We are currently doing surveillance on the house. Captain Qualters and Paul Buckman with D.E.A. are sitting at the house now. Detective Crussen interviewed Percifield at the jail, or at the Bloomington Police Department. After he mirandized him, Percifield told him there were more drugs in the house. When I debriefed the informant, the informant told me that they basically re-upped or resupplied themselves, which makes sense because he was out of state in Pennsylvania. That is what he told the informant yesterday. And his connection is in Indianapolis and he would have to come right down from Indianapolis while coming home yesterday. Due to the fact we did surveillance on him and left his house and went and did a deal and then admitted that were was more drugs in the house, we request that a search warrant be issued for his residence.

Id. at 32-34 (emphasis added). The trial court issued the search warrant. On the same day, the trial court also approved a prosecutor subpoena duces tecum for the subscriber information and all incoming and outgoing calls for Percifield’s cellular phone for January 17, 2002, the day of the first controlled buy.
The State charged Percifield with three counts of dealing in cocaine as class A felonies. Percifield filed a motion to suppress: (1) the evidence seized as a result of the search warrant; and (2) his cellular phone records for January 17, 2002. The trial court issued an order denying Percifield’s motion. With respect to the denial of the motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search warrant, the order provided that:

It is not necessary to recite all of the information provided by Officer Hill to Judge Bridges. [Percifield] frames the crux of the issue in his response brief by contending that “the gap in the State’s proof is the nexus between the defendant’s home and the alleged criminal activity that occurs.”
It is accurate that no such nexus exists with respect to the first “controlled buy” on January 17, 2002.

The second controlled buy was initiated by a telephone call placed by the informant to [Percifield’s] home phone numbers. During that telephone call, which was recorded by the investigating officers, the informant and [Percifield] agreed to meet at the Taco Bell Restaurant on West Third Street in Bloomington where the informant was to pay [Percifield] for the cocaine purchased the previous day and where [Percifield] was to sell to the informant an additional half ounce of cocaine. An agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, who was conducting surveillance of Defendant’s home, then observed [Percifield] get into a van parked in front of his residence and drive to the Taco Bell where the second transaction occurred.

There is no gap in the State’s proof. The initiating telephone call was placed to [Percifield’s] residence. [Percifield] then left his residence and was followed to the Taco Bell where the expected transactions occurred. Additionally, the informant, who had provided information corroborated in all other material respects, advised the police officers that [Percifield] and his alleged associates had just “resupplied” themselves. As all other information provided by the informant, which was substantial, it was reasonable to infer that he/she was “more probably right” about this fact.

[Percifield] argues that Officer Hill mislead Judge Bridges when he informed the judge that [Percifield], “after being Mirandized,” had admitted that there were more illegal substances at his residence. It may be observed that the statement in question was not false. Rather, [Percifield] argues that experienced police officers should have known that the statement was inadmissible against [Percifield] because it was made after he had requested counsel.

Regardless of the merit of that proposition, the Court has concluded that there was probable cause for the warrant to issue even if the statement in question is excluded from consideration. The good faith standard of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), does not come into play.

Id. at 91-92. With respect to the denial of the motion to suppress Percifield’s cellular phone records for January 17, 2002, the trial court’s order provided that:

Similarly, Chief Justice Givan, writing on behalf of a unanimous court in Indiana Bell, quoted I.C. 33-14-1-3, conspicuously omitting the parenthetical language “(except the circuit court.)” Supra, at page 1091.

At least one post-1973 appellate case expressly upheld a subpoena duces tecum issued by a circuit court without even addressing the language in question. In Re Thompson, 479 N.E.2d 1344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1985).

The Court concludes that the intent and purpose of I.C. 33-14-1-3 is to provide judicial oversight to insure that a prosecutor’s investigative subpoena duces tecum is “sufficiently limited in scope, specific in directive, and relevant in purpose to a valid criminal investigation” (Oman v. State, at page 1148) and that circuit courts have not been precluded from exercising that oversight since the enactment of I.C. 35-34-1-1 in 1973.

Id. at 93. At Percifield’s request, the trial court then certified the order for interlocutory appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B).
The sole issue is whether the trial court erred by denying Percifield’s motion to suppress. Review of the denial of a motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency matters. Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 1997). The record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court’s decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. Percifield argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress: (1) the evidence seized as a result of the search warrant; and (2) Percifield’s cellular phone records. We will address Percifield’s arguments separately.

(emphasis added). See footnote Percifield argues that this statute expressly precluded the Monroe Circuit Court from issuing the subpoena duces tecum authorizing the production of his January 17, 2002, cellular phone records.
I.C. § 33-14-1-3 was “enacted in 1852 . . . to give the common pleas courts, which were abolished in 1873, a procedure for investigation of criminal activity similar to the grand jury method in the circuit courts.” Stiles v. State, 156 Ind. App. 675, 681, 298 N.E.2d 466, 469 (1973). In Ellison v. State, 125 Ind. 492, 494, 24 N.E.2d 739, 740 (1890), our supreme court addressed whether circuit courts were precluded from issuing subpoenas under I.C. § 33-14-1-3 and held that:
The inquisition provided for by this statute is simply a preliminary step by which the court may acquire jurisdiction. It was a mode of procedure by the common pleas court, conceding that it had power to proceed in cases of felony, by which it sought to charge and apprehend the offender. In the circuit court the mode of procedure has always been quite different. In that court the mode, in such cases, was to inquire by the grand jury into violations of the criminal laws of the state. It is settled by adjudication that the mode of procedure in the common pleas court was not transferred to the circuit court by the act abolishing the former, where the circuit court had an established mode of its own. The case of State v. Justice, 46 Ind. 210, is a case in point. In that case it was held that the act of the general assembly transferring the business and jurisdiction of the common pleas court to the circuit court did not transfer to the latter court the mode of proceeding by affidavit and information in a criminal case. So in this case, as the mode of inquiring as to violations of the criminal law of the state was by investigation before the grand jury, we are of the opinion that the mode prevailing in the common pleas court, by the inquisition provided for in the statute under consideration, was not transferred to the circuit court. It is plain that it was the intention of the general assembly, at the time of the passage of this statute, that no such inquisition should be conducted in the circuit court, for that court is expressly excepted from its operation. It is reasonable to suppose that the reason for such exception was that that court had ample means, by the use of the grand jury, to inquire into and punish all criminal offenses of which it had jurisdiction. We are of the opinion that the circuit court has no power to hold the inquisition provided for in this statute, and that the appellant was not in contempt in refusing to submit to an examination of the kind in question.

125 Ind. at 496-497, 24 N.E.2d at 741. Almost one hundred years later, in In re Order for Ind. Bell to Disclose Records, 274 Ind. 131, 135, 409 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (Ind. 1980), our supreme court again examined I.C. § 33-14-1-3. There, our supreme court held that under I.C. § 33-14-1-3, “[a] prosecutor has the same ability to accumulate evidence as the grand jury” adding that I.C. § 33-14-1-3 provided a prosecutor with the authority “to charge an individual with the commission of a crime without first submitting the evidence to a grand jury.” See footnote Id. at 134-135, 409 N.E.2d at 1091. The effect of Indiana Bell was to distinguish Ellison, which was based upon the premise that the circuit court was exempt from the subpoena power of I.C. § 33-14-1-3 because it “had ample means, by the use of the grand jury, to inquire into and punish all criminal offenses of which it had jurisdiction.” 125 Ind. at 497, 24 N.E.2d at 741.
As our supreme court recognized in Rita v. State:
[ I.C. § 33-14-1-3] provides a tool for prosecutors to investigate crimes in the first instance. All the statute says is that if a prosecutor learns that a crime may have been committed, the prosecutor may, first, subpoena anyone in the jurisdiction who may know about the crime and, second, seek “process” leading to an arrest if the facts uncovered support that action. Thus, by its express terms the statute is not available at the post-indictment or post-information stage.

674 N.E.2d 968, 970 (Ind. 1996). See footnote Four years later in Oman v. State, our supreme court held that:
Indiana prosecutors are statutorily empowered to investigate criminal activity without the aid of a grand jury and may issue subpoenas to gather both testimonial and documentary evidence. See Ind.Code § 34-14-1-3 (1993). This investigative authority includes the ability to gather documentary evidence maintained by a third party, provided that a trial judge or magistrate first determines the subpoena is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

737 N.E.2d 1131, 1147 (Ind. 2000). See footnote (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 814, 122 S. Ct. 38 (2001). We also recognize that circuit courts have issued subpoenas duces tecum under I.C. § 33-14-1-3. See In re Thompson, 479 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the subpoena duces tecum issued by the Grant Circuit Court directing a bank to produce copies of certain documents was not unreasonably broad and did not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures), reh’g denied; Forbes v. State, 810 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ind. 2004) (holding that that subpoena duces tecum issued by the Clark County Circuit Court requesting that a Kentucky hospital produce medical records was not so unreasonable as to warrant suppression and the subpoena was not defective).
Here, we are asked to consider an exception that has remained in I.C. § 33-14-1-3 (now I.C. § 33-39-1-4) since 1852, when the court structure and prosecutorial regime was quite different than now. Given the current structure of the courts and the organization of prosecutors, the exception is an anachronism. When we look at a statute, we presume that the legislature intends its language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the intent of the statute’s underlying policy and goals. See Town of Plainfield v. Town of Avon, 757 N.E.2d 705, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The purpose of the statue is to enable prosecutors, not to limit jurisdiction of circuit courts. As our supreme court has held, the main purpose is to provide review by a court to see that a subpoena is warranted by the circumstances and that its scope is appropriate. See Oman, 737 N.E.2d at 1147.
We also recognize that there are several counties in Indiana, including Monroe County, that have only circuit courts, See footnote and if we were to follow Percifield’s reasoning, prosecutors in those counties would be unable to issue a subpoena duces tecum in accordance with I.C. § 33-14-1-3 (now I.C. § 33-39-1-4). This conclusion is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. We conclude that I.C. § 33-14-1-3 (now I.C. § 33-39-1-4) does not prohibit circuit courts from issuing a subpoena duces tecum, and the trial court did not err by denying Percifield’s motion to suppress his cellular phone records.
In summary, we hold that: (1) after excluding evidence of Percifield’s tainted admission, there was a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed to search Percifield’s residence, and the trial court did not err by denying Percifield’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search warrant; and (2) I.C. § 33-14-1-3 (now I.C. § 33-39-1-4) does not prohibit circuit courts from issuing subpoenas duces tecum, and the trial court did not err by denying Percifield’s motion to suppress his cellular phone records.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying Percifield’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
DARDEN, J. and ROBB, J. concur