FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
STEVEN C. SMITH JEFFREY A. MODISETT
PATRICK R. RAGAINS Attorney General of Indiana
JANE G. COTTON
Smith, Ragains & Cotton KIMBERLY MACDONALD
Anderson, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
LONNIE D. MORGAN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 48A04-9707-CR-307
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
II. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the revocation.
probation officer, Victor Hill, apparently transferred Morgan's probation in December 1996.See footnote
1
At that time, Hill told Morgan to call him on January 23, 1997. Morgan never called.
In February 1997, Hill learned that Morgan had returned to Indiana. Hill telephoned
Morgan and asked him to report to the probation department. When he met with Hill, Morgan
told the probation officer that he was not moving to Georgia. According to Morgan, he had
decided to move to Arizona. Hill told Morgan to call him in one week. When Morgan failed
to contact Hill, the probation officer attempted to telephone Morgan, and eventually sent
Morgan a letter explaining that a warrant for his arrest would be issued if he did not report to
the probation office. Morgan did not respond to Hill's letter.
On April 3, 1997, Hill filed a notice of probation violation wherein he alleged that
Morgan had violated his probation by, among other things, committing the crime of battery on
April 2, 1997, and failing to timely report to the probation office, complete community service
and pay probation user's fees. After a hearing, the court found that Morgan had violated the
aforementioned terms of his probation and ordered Morgan to serve his six year sentence.
objection in the trial court. See Lock v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1160 (Ind. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 991, 112 S.Ct. 1686, 118 L.Ed.2d 400 (1992).
Waiver notwithstanding, Morgan's arguments lack merit. First, this court has
previously determined that a probation officer has the authority to initiate proceedings to revoke
probation. See Noethtich v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Second, in support of his contention that Hill lacked the authority to initiate revocation
proceedings, Morgan directs us to Ind.Code 11-13-4-1, which governs out-of-state transfers of
probation. Specifically, Morgan points to I.C. 11-13-4-1(2) which provides in part that "each
receiving state will assume the duties of visitation of and supervision over probationers . . . ."
According to Morgan, the "phrase 'transfer of probation' indicates that supervisory duties are
taken from one probation department and given to another." Morgan's Brief, p. 12.
However, our review of the record reveals that it is silent as to whether the State of
Georgia agreed to supervise Morgan's probation, see I.C. 11-13-4-1(1), and/or actually took
supervisory duties from the State of Indiana. Further, even if the State of Georgia did assume
supervisory duties, the transfer of supervision is not the transfer of jurisdiction. I.C. 11-13-4-
1(3) provides that "duly accredited officers of a sending state may enter a receiving state and
there apprehend and retake any person on probation." If Indiana officers would have had the
authority to go to Georgia and retake Morgan, Hill, an Indiana probation officer, had the
authority to initiate probation revocation proceedings against Morgan based on Morgan's
behavior upon his return to Indiana.
Further, upon examination of Ind.Code 11-13-5-1, it is clearly established that should
Morgan have had a probation violation hearing in the receiving state, the appropriate judicial
or administrative authorities were required to notify Indiana regarding any recommendations
that it was making concerning disposition, which would not preclude Indiana from retaking
or reincarcerating Morgan. Morgan's argument is totally without merit, and we find no error.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Morgan further argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the revocation of
his probation. Again, we disagree.
Probation is a matter of grace, and whether probation is granted is within the trial
court's discretion. Bahr v. State, 634 N.E.2d 543, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). The sole
question at a probation revocation hearing is whether the probationer should be allowed to
remain conditionally free, given evidence of repeated antisocial behavior, or rather should
be required to serve the previously imposed sentence in prison. Id.
A revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and the alleged violation
only needs to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. King v. State, 642 N.E.2d
1389, 1393 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). This court will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the
credibility of witnesses. Id. Rather, we look to the evidence most favorable to the State, and
if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's decision that the
probationer is guilty of any violation, revocation of probation is appropriate. Id.
Here, our review of the record reveals that at the revocation hearing, Morgan's
girlfriend, LaTonya Burns, testified that on April 2, 1996, as the couple was driving back to
Anderson from Frankfort with their son, Morgan hit her at least ten times.See footnote
2
Morgan posits
that "LaTonya's story is highly incredible," and is "not sufficient evidence of probative value
to find Morgan violated his probation by a preponderance of the evidence." Morgan's Brief,
pp. 16, 17. However, we must decline his invitation to reweigh the evidence and judge the
credibility of witnesses. We find sufficient evidence to support the revocation of Morgan's
probation.See footnote
3
Affirmed.
SHARPNACK, C.J., and STATON, J., concur.
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