FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:

JEFFREY P. SMITH    SCOTT M. COHEN
W. RANDALL KAMMEYER            JOHN D. BARKER
Fort Wayne, Indiana                 Chicago, Illinois

     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DAIMLER CHRYSLER CORPORATION,    )

                                    )
Appellant-Defendant,                )
                                    )
vs.                                 )    No. 55A05-0402-CV-65
                                    )
SAMUEL YAEGER and DIANE YAEGER,     )
                                    )
Appellees-Plaintiffs.               )

    APPEAL FROM THE MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Jane Spencer Craney, Judge
    Cause No. 55D03-0301-PL-2

    DECEMBER 1, 2004
    OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
HOFFMAN, Senior Judge

II.    Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the Yaegers did not consent to the arbitration provisions of the contract when Diana applied for and obtained special financing for the purchase of the vehicle.

III.     Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the arbitration provision of the contract is prohibited by the Magnuson-Moss Act.

IV.    Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the arbitration provision should be held unenforceable because it was not approved by the Indiana Attorney General.

On or about May 16, 2002, the Yaegers purchased a 2002 Chrysler PT Cruiser from Community Motors. The vehicle was manufactured by Daimler, which warranted that for three years or thirty-six thousand miles it would repair any defects in materials or workmanship in or on the vehicle. Shortly after the Yaegers took possession of the PT Cruiser, the vehicle began to exhibit defects in the power steering mechanism, the engine, and the blower motor.
The Yaegers took the vehicle to Daimler for repairs on more than one occasion, but they were not satisfied with the results. On December 9, 2002, the Yaegers notified Daimler of their intent to revoke acceptance of the vehicle. Due to Daimler’s refusal to recognize the request for revocation of acceptance, the Yaegers filed a complaint alleging breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, violation of the Indiana Motor Vehicle Protection Act (“Indiana Lemon Law”), and revocation of acceptance pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
Daimler filed a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the Yaegers’ appeal. The trial court heard oral argument on the motion and then issued an order denying the motion on the bases that (1) Samuel Yaeger did not consent to binding arbitration and Diane Yaeger did not knowingly consent to binding arbitration; (2) the arbitration clause contained in the contract is unenforceable under the Magnuson-Moss Act; and (3) there was no evidence that Daimler’s arbitration plan had been approved by the Indiana Attorney General. Appellant’s App. at 5. Daimler subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal.

305 F.3d at 1276 (emphasis added).
    In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in McMahon and the federal appellate court decisions in Walton and Davis pertaining to this factor, we conclude that the Yaegers have failed to carry their burden of showing a clear congressional intent to prohibit the binding arbitration of MMWA claims. “[G]iven the absence of any meaningful legislative history barring binding arbitration, coupled with the unquestionable federal policy favoring arbitration,” we conclude that Congress did not express a clear intent in the MMWA’s legislative history to bar binding arbitration agreements such as the one between the Daimler and the Yaegers. See Davis, id.
    The Yaegers argue that the binding arbitration provision in their contract with Daimler is contrary to the purposes of the MMWA. Specifically, the Yaegers refer to their belief that binding arbitration would conflict with the MMWA’s intent to prevent warrantors from making bold promises that were overridden by “tiny type [that] set forth grossly unfair terms and took away more rights than they gave.” Appellee’s Brief at 22. The Yaegers further refer to their belief that “it just does not make sense to strictly regulate other types of dispute resolution and yet allow the warrantor free rein to impose binding arbitration under any terms it chooses.” Id. at 23.
    As noted above, the MMWA expressly states its three purposes: (1) to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers; (2) to prevent deception; and (3) to improve competition in the marketing of consumer products.” 15 U.S.C. § 2302. Despite the Yaegers’ Wilko-like disdain for arbitration, we conclude that the purposes of the MMWA and the FAA are not in conflict. See footnote In fact, “the Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced arbitration of statutory claims where the underlying purpose of the statutes is to protect and inform consumers.” Davis, 305 F.3d at 1276 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 108 S.Ct. 978, 985, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988), which states that a fundamental purpose of the Securities Act is the disclosure of information to potential investors; and Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-86, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1922 (1989), which holds that parties may arbitrate Securities Exchange Act of 1934 claims). “[E]ven claims arising under a statute designed to further important social policies may be arbitrated because so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute serves its function.” Id. (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S.Ct. 513, 521, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000)). The Supreme Court has held that consumers are able to vindicate their rights in an arbitral forum. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280, 115 S.Ct. 834, 842, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995) (holding that “Congress, when enacting the [FAA], had the needs of consumers. . . in mind”). We agree with these cases that arbitration does not work against the purposes of the MMWA. With reference to the Yaegers’ specific concerns, there is no indication that the inclusion of a binding arbitration clause would bring back the days where contractual obligations are overridden by contrary provisions in agate type. Furthermore, it is perfectly consistent for the MMWA to regulate informal dispute mechanisms that are controlled by the warrantor, while not closely regulating third-party controlled arbitrations.
    The Yaegers contend that we should defer to the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) regulations, which prohibit binding arbitration under the MMWA. The MMWA authorizes the FTC to promulgate regulation for the MMWA’s internal dispute settlement procedures. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a). The FTC has stated that “[a] warrantor shall not indicate in any written warranty or service contract either directly or indirectly that the decision of the warrantor, service contractor, or any designated third party is final or binding in any dispute concerning the warranty or service contract.” 16 C.F.R. 703.1(e).
    Numerous courts, both state and federal, have considered this issue. We find the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Davis to be the most persuasive. In Davis, the court first noted that in determining whether we should defer to the FTC’s interpretation of the MMWA, we look to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In Chevron, the Supreme Court stated:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

467 U.S. at 843-44, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82.
    In addressing the first prong of the Chevron inquiry, we begin by examining the language of the enforcement provision itself. See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1278 (quoting Smith v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 273 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001)). As we have already discussed above, Congress did not directly address binding arbitration anywhere in the text or legislative history of the MMWA. Because the intent of Congress is unclear, we must proceed to the second prong of the Chevron analysis. See footnote
    Under the second prong of the Chevron inquiry, we are required to determine whether the FTC’s construction of the statute is reasonable. In making that determination, “we look to the rationale behind the FTC’s construction.” Davis, 305 F.3d at 1278. In its legislative regulations, the FTC reasoned that a decision regarding a warranty dispute may not be binding because “section 110(d) of the Act gives state and federal courts jurisdiction over suits for breach of warranty and service contracts.” See Davis, id. (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 700.8). Interestingly, the FTC has declared that it “is not now convinced that any guidelines which [referred to binding arbitration] could ensure sufficient protection for consumers.” See Davis, id. (quoting 40 Fed.Reg. 60167, 60210 (1975).
    In light of the FTC’s declared basis for its interpretation of the MMWA, the Davis court held that
[A] statute’s provision for a judicial forum does not preclude enforcement of a binding arbitration agreement under the FAA. (citation omitted). Thus, the FTC’s motive behind the legislative regulation is contradictory to Supreme Court rationale, and we conclude that its interpretation is unreasonable. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 107 S.Ct. at 2343 (refusing to follow Congress’ prohibition of arbitration in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’s legislative history when Congress’ motive was contradictory to Supreme Court rationale). We also conclude that the FTC’s additional rationale is unreasonable. Although the FTC first stated that it looked to a subcommittee staff report (which appears to be no longer be attainable) to determine Congress’ intent, the FTC continued evincing its major concern that an arbitral forum will not adequately protect the individual consumers. The Supreme Court in McMahon, however, rejected this same hostility shown by the SEC. 482 U.S. at 234 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. at 2341 n. 3 (declining to defer to the SEC’s interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 based on the SEC’s Wilko attitude). Instead, the Supreme Court holds that arbitration is favorable to the individual. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 279, 115 S.Ct. at 842-43 (noting that “arbitration’s advantages often would seem helpful to individuals, say, complaining about a product, who need a less expensive alternative to litigation”).

305 F.3d at 1279. We agree that the FTC’s interpretive regulations are unreasonable in light of clear Supreme Court precedent. See footnote

VAIDIK, Judge, dissenting
I agree with the majority that Daimler Chrysler has failed to raise its interlocutory appeal under any of the provisions of Indiana Appellate Rule 14. However, I disagree with the majority that we have discretion to hear this appeal under Appellate Rule 66(B). Consequently, I would dismiss the appeal.
    Appellate Rule 14 provides three ways for this Court to hear an interlocutory appeal: (1) Appellate Rule 14(A) allows interlocutory appeals as of right; (2) Appellate Rule 14(B) permits discretionary interlocutory appeals “if the trial court certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the appeal”; and (3) Appellate Rule 14(C) authorizes other interlocutory appeals only as provided by statute. This appeal does not fall under any of the categories listed for interlocutory appeals as of right. Additionally, there is no statute authorizing this interlocutory appeal. Finally, because Daimler Chrysler did not file a motion requesting certification by the trial court and then file a motion requesting acceptance by this Court, this is not a discretionary interlocutory appeal. Nevertheless, the majority found that it has discretion to hear this appeal under Appellate Rule 66(B).
Appellate Rule 66(B) provides:
No appeal shall be dismissed as of right because the case was not finally disposed of in the trial court or Administrative Agency as to all issues and parties, but upon suggestion or discovery of such a situation, the Court may, in its discretion, suspend consideration until disposition is made of such issues, or it may pass upon such adjudicated issues as are severable without prejudice to parties who may be aggrieved by subsequent proceedings in the trial court or Administrative Agency.

In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Scroghan, 801 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, the court acknowledged that other panels of the court of appeals have suggested that we may find jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal outside of Appellate Rule 14. Id. at 195. However, the Allstate court opted to follow the reasoning of INB National Bank v. 1st Source Bank, 567 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), wherein the court held:
[Rule 66(B)] should not be interpreted as an alternative authorization to litigants to initiate interlocutory appeals apart from, or in addition to, the authorization provided by [Rule 14]. In addition, we believe it would constitute an abuse of discretion for this court to grant an interlocutory appeal cognizable under [Rule 14(B)] where the trial court, as here, has expressly refused or denied certification.

Id. at 1202. I stand by my previous decision in Allstate and echo its reasoning that if we were to allow the use of Appellate Rule 66(B) to supplement our jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals under Appellate Rule 14, then the limitations of Appellate Rule 14 would become meaningless. Allstate, 801 N.E.2d at 196; see also Bueter v. Brinkman, 776 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to apply Rule 66(B) to “rescue” an appeal). Additionally, this case is more compelling than Allstate because in that case, Allstate requested certification by the trial court, but the court denied it. Here, Daimler Chrysler did not even request certification. Accordingly, I would hold that this Court does not have discretion to hear this appeal and therefore would dismiss it.